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1  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Current conflict and displacement trends - showing an increase in out-of-camp displacement 
- pose a challenge to humanitarian actors such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) because 
assessment  tools  and  intervention  strategies  are  mainly  based  on  experiences  in  camp 
settings.  
 
The  purpose  of  this  evaluation  was  to  review  the  experience  in  needs  assessment  and 
response to displacement in open settings. For the evaluation process, six interventions were 
reviewed: MSF Operational Centre Geneva (OCG) interventions in the Democratic Republic 
of  Congo  (DRC)  (Haut-Uélé),  Djibouti,  Cameroon  and  Iraq;  Operational  Centre  Brussels 
(OCB) interventions in South Africa and Pakistan; and partial review of Operational Centre 
Paris (OCP) experience in Pakistan.  
 
Challenges  identified  include  invisibility,  geographical  spread,  multiple  displacements, 
security constraints and the constantly changing environment. Displacements happen in an 
environment with fluctuating availability of resources and an infrastructure, which functions to 
variable extents. 
 
Main findings on assessment show that critical information was lacking, and decision-
making often based on poor qualitative data because reliable quantitative data had not 
been  available.  Views  of  internally  displaced  persons  (IDPs)  were  sorely  lacking  in 
assessments  and  external  sources  of  information  were  underused.  There  is  a  lack  of 
frameworks for understanding the concept of vulnerability and the related notion of risk. 
The identification of needs is more complex in open settings and much more attention needs 
to be paid to conducting sound assessments. The assessment of imminent risks is essential, 
especially in absence of acute needs. Changes in the situation have to be expected and 
there  is  a  need  for  “continual  assessment”.  Existing  assessment  tools  are  applicable 
(although none are specific to open settings), but assessments need to be tailored to the 
specific  context  and  the  level  of  emergency.  The  health  system,  access  barriers  and 
health  seeking  behaviour  must  be  better  explored.  Systematic  use  of  qualitative 
assessment methods  is required to understand the diverse  vulnerabilities, capacities and 
coping strategies. The complexity of open settings requires more attention and resources for 
assessment. 
 
In situations of population displacement, crude and under-five mortalities (CMR, U5MR) are 
considered the key indicators to evaluate the magnitude of a crisis and the effectiveness of 
the humanitarian response. This evaluation points out the difficulties to using mortality 
rates (MR) as a prime indicator in open settings. Quantitative methods (sample surveys, 
counting population, etc.) have important limitations where access is limited and population is 
scattered or invisible. Overcoming some of these would require significantly more resources 
and competencies than are allocated today. One-off mortality surveys provided varying 
results due to rapidly changing character of the crises. Such results are of little value in 
absence of prospective mortality surveillance to able to detect trends of mortality over time. 
Alternative  indicators  and  innovative  methods  to  measure  mortality  are  needed;  proxy 
indicators such as food security and access to health care and other basic needs could be an 
example.   
 
MSFs key reference book, the Refugee Health bases its logic on a linear progression from 
emergency to post-emergency phase. In open settings, a clear delineation between these 
two phases often does not exist, and peaks of acute need may regularly emerge during 
protracted  crises.  The  Top  Ten  Priorities  (from  Refugee  Health)  aim  at  reducing  high   6 
mortality during the emergency phase by targeting risk factors typical of camp-like settings.
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However, the risks factors vary greatly in many open setting situations.  
Intervention  strategies  reviewed  were  often  decided  on  an  ad  hoc  basis  and  changed 
frequently, partially  due  to  uncertainty about  the appropriateness of  choices. This is  well 
understood  in  the  absence  of  evidence-based  tools  that  could  provide  guidance  on 
intervention choices, objectives and indicators adapted to such complex settings. Unlike in 
camp situations where timely assistance would in most cases be demonstrated by decreased 
mortality  rates,  the  impact  of  interventions  in  most  open  settings  can  hardly  be 
measured.  
 
Classical short-term ‘emergency relief’ was rarely seen in the reviewed interventions and 
the medical strategy in most intervention aimed at support or facilitation of access to existing 
health structures.  
 
Engagement with the existing health system is much more demanded in open settings, 
but remains a main challenge. In open settings, it is hardly feasible to duplicate the ‘four-level 
health care model’ (from community health workers to the referral hospital) developed for 
camps,  simply  because  of  the  immense  resources  needed.  Evaluators  argue  that  the 
engagement  at  hospital  level  must  be  made  more  consciously  in  terms  of  the  potential 
investment and the expected output. In the absence of a functioning referral system, few 
patients effectively have access to supported hospital services. There are positive examples 
from the field that illustrate how “light support” enabled primary health facilities to cater 
to the excess burden caused by displacement.  
 
Effectiveness of mobile clinics greatly depended on the phase of the emergency; outreach 
workers proofed invaluable, however the practical set-up requires improvement. Non-medical 
assistance was marginal in the reviewed interventions, objectives for non food item (NFI) 
distributions were unclear, and the minimum standards for water and sanitation (WatSan) 
and shelter are often not applicable to open settings.  
 
The widespread needs in non camp situations present differently in rural or urban setting and 
must be addressed with flexible and innovative strategies. In rural setting they need to aim at 
better coverage, and opt for community-based approaches. Only with strong involvement 
of the affected communities can activities be continued even where (external) staff presence 
is  restricted.  One  workable  choice  may  be  to  simplify  the  intervention  strategies  by 
targeting the main cause of morbidity and mortality rather than aiming at globally improved 
healthcare provision. In urban areas the “light support” or facilitation of access to existing 
heath structures seems an appropriate choice. A strong partnership with local NGOs and 
existing networks of civil society organisations is essential and their capacity and experience 
should be exploited not only to deliver humanitarian assistance, but also to advocate to local 
governments for better coverage of the needs.  
 
Generally, a better balance between prevention and early diagnosis and treatment is 
needed. The current work on innovative strategies within MSF/OCG may serve as a real 
opportunity for a sustained change in that direction.  
 
MSF  needs  a  new  concept  for  working  in  open  settings.  Evaluators  recommend 
developing  new  intervention  frames  based  on  existing  models  and  they  provide  specific 
considerations for those. New approaches and strategies will have to be tested and their 
outcomes measured and compared. Operational research is needed to prove results and 
develop innovations further.  
                                                  
1 Typical risk factors of camp-like settings: overcrowding, inadequate shelter, poor water, sanitation and 
hygiene conditions, lacking treatment facilities and insufficient nutrient intake.   7 
2  INTRODUCTION  
 
Displacement of refugees and IDPs in open settings is not a new phenomenon - both groups 
have traditionally settled outside of camps. However, over the past three decades refugee 
issues have been looked at from a camp paradigm, resulting in policies and practice that 
equate  to  refugees  in  camps.  Humanitarian  agencies  have  primarily  targeted  refugees 
settled in camps, neglecting the needs of self-settled refugees and IDPs (Chambers, 1979) 
based on the assumption that the latter are the exception rather than the rule. Today, the 
camp-based  approach  is  increasingly  criticized  and  encampment  discouraged  whenever 
alternative solutions are viable and political will exists. Displacement in open settings – both 
urban and rural – is now acknowledged as a growing trend and recognition of the needs of 
displaced persons outside camps has lead to the development of new policies (UNHCR, 
2009a).  
The  current  trend  poses  a  challenge  to  humanitarian  actors  such  as  MSF  because 
assessment  tools  and  intervention  strategies  developed  for  displacement  situations  are 
mainly based on experiences in closed settings, particularly camps.  
This evaluation aimed to assess current challenges and shortcomings in needs assessments 
and response to displacement in open settings, and to adapt assessment techniques and 
intervention strategies accordingly. The outcomes will feed into an ongoing OCG working 
group on displacement in open settings and provide the basis for a future training module.  
The objectives of the evaluation were to review available external competencies and internal 
MSF experience in order to: i) assess the appropriateness of assessment techniques and 
tools currently used by MSF, in order to improve them for future interventions; and ii) analyse 
the appropriateness of intervention strategies.  
The following projects were selected for evaluation from OCG and OCB:  
MSF section   Project location    Project start date  Project end date 
OCG  DRC (Haut-Uélé)   2008  Ongoing 
OCG  Cameroon  July 2007  March 2009 
OCG  Djibouti  October 2008  Ongoing 
OCG  Iraq (Kurdistan)  November 2007  June 2008 
OCB  South Africa  December 2007  Ongoing 
OCB  Pakistan  May 2009  End 2009 
 
All reference literature used for this evaluation is  cited at the end of the  document. The 
detailed Terms of Reference and evaluation questions are available in Annex 1.  
 
The  report  starts  with  an  introduction  to  evaluation  processes  and  methods  as  well  as 
definitions  and  concepts  used.  History  and  current  trends  of  displacement  are  briefly 
described, with a particular focus on displacement in open settings and an elaboration of the 
case study settings. A chapter on operational challenges follows. The two main chapters on 
assessment  and  intervention  strategies  look  into  existing  internal  and  external  tools  and 
policies, describe findings from the reviewed projects and end with a discussion on these 
findings. Recommendations are provided in the final chapter. A series of annexes is provided 
and  references  made  in  the  respective  chapters.  Details  of  reviewed  interventions  are 
described in a separate part of the report (part II). 
 
This evaluation covers a wide range of issues; it has not been possible to explore all of them 
in  the  depth  they  deserve.  Further  investigations  into  many  of  these  subjects  would  be 
certainly needed, and some recommendations will require more detailed elaboration.    8 
2.1  Evaluation process and methods 
Alena Koscalova (MD) and Elena Lucchi (MSc) formed the evaluation team; Giuseppe Scollo 
had joined the team in the initial phase. The evaluation team members represented different 
positions on the key issues under assessment: on the one hand, arguing in favour of the ‘old-
school thinking’ of MSF, with a focus on established and proven operational experience and 
practice;  on  the  other,  emphasising  the  need  for  rigour  and  sound  methodology  in 
assessment  as  well  as  flexibility  and  innovation  in  intervention  strategies.  The  team 
recognises that this tension reflects the current reality in MSF.  
The  projects  chosen  for  review  are  managed  by  two  different  MSF  Operational  Centres 
(OCG and OCB). The choice of project countries was driven by the need to analyse a variety 
of open displacement settings, both rural and urban, and to provide a balanced perspective 
of experiences in low income and middle to high income countries.  
The evaluation team gathered the relevant documents from all the projects under review, 
including  assessment  reports,  surveys,  project  reports,  mission  reports  and  advocacy 
documents.  
Assessment tools and manuals currently in use within the MSF Movement were reviewed as 
well as existing tools and literature from other humanitarian organisations.  
The team interviewed key informants at MSF headquarters both in Geneva and Brussels, 
including  managers  of  regular  and  emergency  desks,  health  advisors,  epidemiologists, 
advocacy  specialists  and  others.  During  field  trips,  key  informants  in  the  field  and 
beneficiaries were also interviewed; see Annex 2 for list of interviewees.  
The  team  visited three MSF interventions: in  Djibouti, in DRC  (Haut-Uélé), and in South 
Africa. The purpose was to have a closer look at key projects, discuss with the team on the 
ground and directly observe the conditions and needs of vulnerable communities.  
In order to standardize the information collected through interviews with key stakeholders 
and beneficiaries, interview checklists were used.  
On  the  basis  of  all  the  information  collected  through  the  above-mentioned  methods,  the 
evaluators compiled a ‘country file’ for each country including key issues on assessments 
and implementation strategies, challenges, strengths and weaknesses. Detailed information 
on the country case studies, and the ‘country file’, are available in part II of the report.  
Limitations 
Limited access or poor availability of relevant information made it difficult to review a number 
of  projects.  Retrospective  information  on  assessments  was  often  hard  to  find.  Some 
documents for desk review were obtained late or not at all. For some countries the evaluation 
team was presented with a large number of documents to review without a pre-selection of 
the key papers – this slowed down the evaluation process further.  
The team did not always succeed in interviewing the key persons from the desk, because of 
field  visits,  holiday  and  staff  being  called  away  to  respond  to  the  Haiti  earthquake 
emergency. In addition, the involvement of more than one desk at different stages of the 
projects made the understanding of some interventions very challenging. 
Members of the evaluation team had varying availabilities, which slowed down the work of 
the team considerably.  
2.2  Definitions and concepts 
For the purposes of this evaluation, and for the sake of simplicity, the team decided to use 
the  term  ‘displaced’  indiscriminately  in  the  report.  The  evaluators  refer  to  ‘displaced’ 
regardless of the individual’s refugee, IDP or socio-economic migrant status in the general 
parts. In practical examples the evaluators try to be more specific about displacement status 
and related vulnerabilities.    9 
The  evaluators  fully  appreciate  the  importance  to  know  the  legal  status  of  our  target 
population, as it will guide the teams on deciding who to mobilize (in terms of authorities and 
other agencies), and which arguments to use in advocacy activities if felt appropriate and 
necessary. Therefore definitions of key terms are provided below.  
 
‘Open settings’ means any non-camp displacement. By definition, an open setting is a site 
with no clear boundaries. Different definitions of ‘camp’ have been used in the literature. 
Edith Bowles in her article about the Thai-Burma border uses the word ‘camp’ to describe 
both small, open settlements where the refugee community has been able to maintain a 
village atmosphere and larger, more crowded camps where they are more dependent on 
assistance  (Black,  1998).  In  the  evaluation,  it  is  the  latter  definition  for  camps  that  the 
evaluators  use. Additionally, the evaluators use the term ‘camp-like setting’ to  describe 
situations without a formal camp management, but similar to camps with respect to size, 
density  and  dependence  on external aid. The main  differences between camp  and non–
camp settings are illustrated in Annex 3.  
Box 1: Commonly used terms 
 
￿ Asylum  Seeker: An  asylum seeker is a person who has  left their country of origin, has 
applied for recognition as a refugee in another country, and is awaiting a decision on their 
application. 
 
￿ Internally Displaced Person (IDP): Internally displaced persons are "persons or groups of 
persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations 
of generalised violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and 
who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border." (UNOCHA, 2007)
  
 
￿ Migrant: There is no comprehensive and universally accepted definition of a migrant. One 
definition says that a migrant is "any person who lives temporarily or permanently in a country 
where he or she was not born, and has acquired some significant social ties to this country." 
(UNESCO, 1995-2010) Generally speaking, a migrant is a person who moves from one place 
to another (either within a country or crossing an international border) to live and usually to 
work, either temporarily or permanently (Amnesty International,  2006). Migrants are people 
who  make choices  about  when  to leave  and where  to  go, even  though these  choices are 
sometimes extremely constrained.  
 
￿ Mixed  Migration:  “Complex  population  movements  including  refugees,  asylum  seekers, 
economic  migrants  and  other  migrants”  (IOM,  2004).  Forced  and  voluntary  migrants 
increasingly  move  alongside  each  other,  using  the  same  routes  and  means  of  transport. 
Lacking safe and legal alternatives, they are forced to use the services of smugglers and often 
face violations of their human rights in transit and/or in countries of destination (MSF OCBA, 
2009).  
 
￿ Refugee: According to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a refugee is 
a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country 
of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country…" (UNHCR, 1951).
  
 
The 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa uses the 1951 Convention definition and extends it to cover those 
compelled  to  leave  their  country  of  origin  on  account  of  “external  aggression,  occupation, 
foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his 
country of origin or nationality” (African Union, 1969).
  
 
￿ Returnees:  Refugees  or  IDPs  who  have  voluntarily  returned  to  their  own  countries  or 
villages of origin. (UNHCR, 2002-2010). 
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Other key concepts. 
- The notion of acute versus protracted nature of a crisis. Refugee crises have traditionally 
equalled  emergency  situations;  therefore  the  typical  response  has  been  an  emergency 
intervention. From a medical point of view, open settings are not automatically emergency 
situations in the classical sense. They may be as severe in terms of overall mortality, but 
often  these  protracted,  intermittent  crises  show  a  complex  dynamic  of  increasing 
vulnerabilities,  multiple  coping  strategies  and  a  steady  exhaustion  of  the  latter.  In  many 
cases  they  could  be  considered  pre-emergencies,  with  the  risk  that  the  humanitarian 
situation turns into an emergency if no assistance is provided.  
-  The  concepts  of  primary  health  care  (PHC)  as  part  of  overall  development,  and  of 
emergency  medical  assistance  (EMA),  or  emergency  relief.  Van  Damme  (1998)  has 
developed a reference framework on these two concepts and how they need to be seen in 
relation to the stability or instability of a given situation. He points to the act of balancing 
between ‘assisting refugees’ and ‘developing and safeguarding the existing health system.’ 
 
2.3  History of displacement 
Camps  for  displaced  persons  were  first  observed  in  post-war  Europe.  There  have  been 
refugee camps in the Middle East since 1948 and in Uganda since 1959. However, during 
this period most people settled outside of the camps (Freund/Kalumba, 1986) and camps 
were the exception rather than the rule (Pitterman, 1984). A systematic approach to medical 
care in refugee camps was first reported in 1971 when some 10 million refugees fleeing 
former East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) to Bengal, India were installed in more than 1,000 
camps along the border. (Seaman, 1972; Van Damme, 1995) The successful experience of 
Bangladesh led to the implicit assumption by UNHCR and other humanitarian actors that 
refugees can be best cared for in camps and before the Goma crisis few challenged this 
assumption.
2  
One of the strongest critics of camps, Barbara Harell-Bond pointed to their negative impact 
on  physical,  mental  and  social  wellbeing  by  encouraging  passivity  and  dependence  on 
external assistance. She argued that if the goal of assisting refugees is to maintain their 
ability to be self-sufficient, then aid should follow refugees rather than forcing refugees to 
follow the aid (Harell-Bond, 1998 and 1994).  
Van Damme argued that the refugee camp approach was successful during the Bangladesh 
crisis because refugees were spread over a large number of small camps and because the 
problem  was  temporary.  Unlike  Bangladesh  (and  Pakistan  in  2009),  many  displacement 
crises are protracted and the negative aspects of camps outweigh their potential benefits 
once the initial emergency has passed. In his extensive work on the subject, Van Damme 
presents  an alternative to  camps based on  the example of  refugees from Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea where assistance to self-settled refugees was integrated into the existing 
health system benefiting both refugees and the host population (Van Damme, 1995). 
 
The negative effects of protracted encampment were emphasised recently (Loescher, 2008). 
Earlier, it was highlighted that the general argument against camps might be better put to 
governments,  who  have  ultimate  responsibility  for  settlement  policy,  rather  than  to 
international organisations (Black, 1998). 
                                                  
2 About 500 000 to 800 000 of Rwandan Hutu refugees flew into the North Kivu region of Zaire in July 
1994and were confined into large, massively overcrowded camps with poor sanitary conditionsr. About 10% 
died within one month, mainly because of a cholera epidemic, Health care was vastly insufficient, GAM up to 
18-23% were recorded    11 
 
2.4  Current trends of displacement 
The past two decades have seen an increasing trend towards internal displacement rather 
than  refugee  situations  (see  Graph  1  below),  reflecting  the  rise  in  internal  conflicts, 
increasing  urbanisation  and  perhaps  the  hardening  attitudes  of  host  countries  towards 
acceptance  of  large  numbers  of  refugees  (Salama  et  al,  2004).  Trends  in  internal 
displacement show that the majority of IDPs do not seek shelter in camps, but with relatives, 
friends or members of their community or ethnic group in urban or rural areas. 
Precise  information  on  the  profile  of  displaced  populations  (forcibly  displaced  or  not), 
including their location and their number disaggregated by age and sex, was still limited in 
2008 and essential data is lacking. Available figures on general trends are summarised in 
Box 2 below.  
 
Box 2: General trends in displacement 
 
·  There were some 42  million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the  end of 2008. 
  This  includes  15.2  million  refugees,  827,000  asylum-seekers  (pending  cases)  and  26 
  million IDPs (UNHCR, 2009b). 
 
·  The  most  affected  continent  is  Africa with  11.6  million IDPs  in  19 countries (Internal 
  Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)/NRC, 2009). 
 
·  In  addition,  approximately  36  million  people  were  displaced  as  a  result  of  sudden-
  onset natural disasters (IDMC, 2009). 
 
·  More  than  839,000  people  submitted  an  individual  application  for  asylum  or  refugee 
  status  in  2008.  More  than  16,300  asylum  applications  were  lodged  by  unaccompanied 
  and separated children in 68 countries.  
 
·  With one quarter of applications globally, South Africa is the largest recipient of   individual 
applications in the world. 
 
·  Women and girls constitute 47 per cent of refugees and asylum-seekers, and half of 
  all IDPs and returnees (refugees). Forty-four per cent of refugees and asylum-seekers 
  are children below 18 years of age. 
 
·  Developing  countries  are  host  to  four-fifths  of  the world’s  refugees.  Based  on  the 
  data available for 8.8 million refugees, UNHCR estimates that half of the world’s   refugees 
reside in urban areas and one third in camps. However, seven out of ten   refugees  in  sub-
Saharan Africa reside in camps. 
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Some new trends are starting to emerge in terms of displacement patterns. These trends 
deserve  particular  attention  and  reflect  the  changing  nature  and  focus  of  humanitarian 
emergencies, from short-term emergencies in refugee camps to prolonged emergencies over 
large geographical areas (Salama et al, 2004).  
 
Graph 1 
Number of refugees living in camp-like, urban, or 
rural and dispersed settings, 1996–2008*(Spiegel et 
al, 2010). 
Graph 2 
Estimated populations of refugees and internally 
displaced people, 1993 to 2008** (Spiegel et al, 
2010). 
 
*Only major refugee populations recorded by UNHCR (generally >50,000 people) are included; thus, 
numbers  do not represent the total refugee population worldwide. Definitions  of major populations 
used by UNHCR varied by year (≥10,000 in 1993 and 1994, not stated in 1995, ≥100 in 1996 and 
1997, ≥1,000 in 1998, ≥100 in 1999 and 2000, ≥5,000 in 2001–05, no limit stated in 2006–08). Before 
1999, refugees were mainly registered in camps, and data for those in urban or rural and dispersed 
localities were mostly not recorded, and are only shown for years since 1999. 
**Dashed line from 1993 to 2001 shows that population data for IDPs were inconsistently recorded. 
Data are combined IDMC and UNHCR estimates. IDMC figures were used when two numbers for the 
same country were reported for both sources, because UNHCR reports for only IDPs for whom they 
have responsibility. The midpoint was used if IDMC figures provided a range for population size. 
 
2.5  Displacement in open settings 
In more than half of the displacement situations monitored in 2008, displaced or refugee 
populations  were  dispersed,  having  in  many  cases  found  refuge  with  host  communities 
outside organized camps either in rural or urban areas. This pattern of displacement is also 
called displacement in open settings. (NRC/ IDMC/ OCHA 2008) Displaced populations are 
found in a wide range of locations, including but not limited to the following:  
·  With host families, friends and relatives (urban or rural).  
·  In urban settings – often in slum areas – in and around major towns and cities where 
they intermingle with local communities.  
·  In rural settings, where displaced populations are often scattered across large rural 
areas living in proximity or hosted by local families. 
·  Occupying public or private buildings.  
·  In  transit  between  locations,  in  search  of  grazing  for  their  livestock,  or  as  ‘night 
commuters’ seeking safety from armed attack.  
·  Hiding in forests or other rural settings where they ﬂed before or following an attack, 
or in fear of an attack.    13 
 
In some situations people prefer to remain anonymous and inconspicuous, not wishing to 
draw attention to themselves for fear of arrest, eviction or other perceived threat. Displaced 
populations often shift between these various situations or divide their families or become 
separated  so  that  different  family  members  may  find  themselves  in  different  situations 
simultaneously.  
Increasingly, urban areas are becoming the destination of choice for many refugees, IDPs 
and migrant workers displaced in open settings. According to UNHCR, one out of two legally 
recognized refugees currently lives in urban areas (UNHCR, 2009b). 
This is in part due to the global trend of urbanization and the fact that people are on the look-
out for new opportunities in cities (employment, anonymity, support from relatives). Many of 
the displaced in urban areas – especially those that are not recognized as refugees – lack 
the protection and assistance which is provided to refugees in camps, and are thus very 
vulnerable (UNHCR, 2008). 
Mixed  migration  patterns  are  one  of  the  current  challenges.  While  refugees  and  asylum 
seekers account for a relatively small proportion of the global movement of people, they 
increasingly move from one country or continent to another alongside other people whose 
reasons for moving are different and not necessarily protection-related (e.g. extreme poverty 
or hunger, environmental disasters, etc.).  
 
Selected case studies for the evaluation 
The  case  studies  evaluated  were  chosen  in  order  to  reflect  the  existing  diversity  in 
displacement  patterns.  Box  3  below  shows  the  multiple  features  of  displacement  case 
studies. 
Case studies from Cameroon, DRC, Pakistan and Iraq represent rural displacement, where 
people are scattered in many places over a large geographical area, and therefore difficult to 
reach.  
In Cameroon, refugees fleeing violence from Central African Republic (CAR) were scattered 
in  74  settlements  along  the  border,  co-existing  with  the  host  community.  The  arrival  of 
refugees was progressive and the humanitarian situation steadily worsened over time with 
diminishing  coping  mechanisms  due  to  scarce  food  resources  and  late  humanitarian 
intervention resulting in a high level of acute malnutrition and mortality peaking above the 
emergency threshold.  
In DRC, the violence committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) continues to force 
people to move from rural areas to other rural areas or small towns in search of security. 
IDPs traditionally stay with host families, returning intermittently to their homes where they 
feel physically, emotionally and spiritually more secure, rather than fleeing to refugee-like 
camps. An estimated 70 per cent of IDPs stay with host families. A new trend was observed 
recently,  with  more  people  joining  formal  or  informal  camps.  The  main  reason  for  this 
phenomenon  is  thought  to  be  the  increasing  ‘saturation’  of  overburdened  communities 
hosting  IDPs  and  insufficient  humanitarian  assistance  provided  to  the  host  communities 
(Haver, 2008). The character of the DRC crisis is also intermittent, with several waves of 
displacement following peaks of violence.  
Iraq  and  Pakistan  are  two  middle-income  countries  where  people  have  been  forcibly 
displaced  because  of  conflict.  In  both  countries  displacement  was  on  a  large  scale  and 
people  found  accommodation  in  a  variety  of  places.  More  than  half  of  the  displaced 
population shared houses with other families. In Pakistan, in Takht Bhai, Mardan district, 
most IDPs were living in public buildings and with host families. The displacement crisis was 
rather sudden and of short duration in Pakistan; in Iraq it was protracted and occurred in 
several waves.    14 
Djibouti and South Africa are both examples of mixed patterns of migration towards urban 
settings. Refugees, asylum seekers and migrants live in the poor neighbourhoods and slums 
of big cities such as Djibouti  town or  Johannesburg.  The  onset of the displacement and 
migration crisis is of a progressive and protracted nature.  
In terms of the health system, this was relatively well functioning in Iraq, Pakistan, and South 
Africa. In Djibouti and Cameroon, the health system is functioning, but important gaps are 
present and the cost-recovery system is a major barrier to access to healthcare. In DRC, the 
health  system  is  poorly  functioning  and  collapses  easily  when  faced  with  minimal 
disturbances.  
The  profile  of  countries  affected  by  conflict  is  gradually  shifting  towards  higher  baseline 
incomes and life expectancies (South Africa, Iraq, Pakistan) which change the burden of 
disease.  While  infectious  diseases  and  neonatal  disorders  remain  important  causes  of 
excess mortality in low income countries, chronic non-infectious diseases are dominant in 
middle to high income countries. 
Clearly, the context in the selected case studies differs in many ways: setting (rural versus 
urban,  low  income  versus  middle  to  high  income);  type  of  accommodation  upon  arrival 
(squats in South Africa, host families in DRC, in proximity with host community in Cameroon, 
etc.);  scale  of  displacement  (large  scale  in  Pakistan  and  Iraq);  onset  (sudden  onset  in 
Pakistan, progressive in others); duration of displacement (very short in Pakistan, protracted 
in others).  
Such  diversity  explains  the  complexity  of  displacement  situations  in  open  settings  and 
renders the analysis and identification of common issues even more challenging.  
 
Box 3: Displacement patterns and settings of selected case studies  
  Low income and life 
expectancy 
Medium to high income and 
life expectancy 
Rural settings 
Living dispersed with or in proximity to host 
families, relatives or friends, hiding in 
forest or other rural areas 
·  Cameroon* 
·  DRC 
·  Djibouti 
·  Pakistan 
·  Iraq (Kurdistan) 
·  South Africa 
Urban settings 
Often in slum areas, scattered in and 
around major cities where they intermingle 
with local communities 
·  Djibouti  ·  South Africa 
·  Iraq (Kurdistan) 
·  Pakistan 
 
Camp-like setting (rural or urban) 
Formal camps, but also informal 
settlements such as schools, public or 
private buildings, churches or new 
displaced villages 
·  DRC 
·  Djibouti 
·  South Africa 
·  Pakistan 
·  Iraq (Kurdistan) 
 
* Bold font indicates the predominant displacement pattern in a particular country.    15 
 
3  OPERATIONAL CHALLENGES IN OPEN SETTINGS 
 
This chapter provides a synthesis of the main operational challenges experienced in projects 
in open settings. It also gives an overview of the relationship between specific challenges 
and certain types of displacement. The focus is on operational challenges experienced in the 
projects reviewed within this evaluation; however, some challenges from other sources are 
also included. Although common issues are reported in many similar contexts, it is important 
to note that a wide variety of factors influence the nature of operational challenges, including: 
-  security  
-  rapidity of onset (sudden, slow) 
-  duration of displacement (short, prolonged) 
-  character of emergency (acute, chronic, intermittent) 
-  causes of displacement 
-  humanitarian space 
-  level of trauma experienced 
-  accessibility, affordability and quality of existing health services 
-  cultural communalities / differences with host population 
 
A number of these identified challenges which are closely linked to assessment methodology 
(e.g. population counting, use of surveys, standard indicators and intervention criteria), or to 
types of intervention (dealing with mental health and chronic diseases), are discussed in 
detail later in this report.  
 
Defining and identifying “the most vulnerable” 
Although  there  is  broad  consensus  that  MSF  should  always  be  aiming  for  the  most 
vulnerable, there is little agreement on how to define them. Directly linking vulnerability with 
the displacement is questioned when in fact the host populations is in need as well (Djibouti, 
Cameroun, DRC, South Africa). Definitions of vulnerability in reviewed interventions seemed 
mainly linked to operational priorities (malnourished children, victims of sexual violence, etc.). 
A  common  operational  practice  was  to  target  sites  with  larger  number  of  displaced 
(Cameroun, DRC, Pakistan). However the most vulnerable might not necessarily be found 
there.  
The challenge to identify the most vulnerable presents itself differently depending on urban 
or rural setting. In rural areas IDPs often live scattered in vast areas or are hiding for fear of 
attacks. In urban settings the humanitarian situation can be more critical at the beginning of 
the  displacement,  before  people  establish  themselves  and  identify  networks  and  coping 
strategies. In rural setting, where the local population is hosting the displaced, the situation 
may be less severe in the beginning when support capacity of local population is present, but 
it often worsens with decreasing resources and coping strategies.  
 
Invisibility in urban areas 
In urban areas potential beneficiaries are often highly mobile, sometimes inaccessible and 
frequently integrated into existing slums and settlements scattered across the city. Refugees 
and IDPs who have been displaced in or to urban areas often have particular reasons for 
remaining hidden, such as fear of harassment, detention or eviction. 
In  South  Africa, the  majority  of  Zimbabwean migrants  remained  ‘invisible’  due  to  fear  of 
deportation until asylum permits were made readily available to all Zimbabweans entering 
South Africa with a valid passport and deportation was stopped. However, police harassment   16 
and threats of xenophobic attacks continue.
3 The problem of invisibility remains for migrants 
entering South Africa without documents or for those who overstay the legal permit (and are 
forced back to ‘invisibility’). The essential question remains: how can we identify and assist 
this vulnerable population? The use of small, less visible support teams, mainly from the 
same community, has proved to be a workable strategy in South Africa. In Djibouti, due to 
more benevolent authorities, the invisibility of illegal migrants is less an issue. 
 
Geographical spread in rural areas 
Huge efforts and resources are required to reach a population when it is spread over a large 
geographical area. Needs are not easily visible and difficult physical access hinders needs 
assessments.  
In Cameroon, refugees were living in 74 settlements, with 100 to 2,500 refugees per site, 
spread along the 650km border with CAR. New pockets of refugees and a high proportion of 
non-registered  refugees  posed  additional  problems  in  terms  of  assessing  needs.  One 
consequence  was  that  it  was  extremely  difficult  to  follow  up  patients  on  the  nutrition 
programme, which was a key reason for the high defaulter rate.4  
In DRC, the displaced are dispersed as a result of the high mobility of the LRA with multiple 
attacks spread over a large area. Thus the situation in Haut Uélé is constantly changing (new 
pockets of displacements, multiple displacements, populations cut off from assistance, etc). 
In Pakistan, many IDPs were seeking refuge in hard-to-reach mountainous areas, far from 
the reach of humanitarian actors. 
 
Constantly changing humanitarian situation and needs 
In  open  settings,  the  humanitarian  situation  can  change  considerably  over  time.  In 
DRC/Dungu, the displaced population was initially accommodated by host families, but later 
became  autonomous  and  constructed  their  own  huts  in  an  area  assigned  by  the  local 
authorities.  Paradoxically,  this  increased  their  vulnerability,  since  they  left  most  of  the 
received  assets
5  to  the  host  families  and  settled  in  an  area  with  limited  possibilities  to 
cultivate  due  to  security  constraints.  In  the  absence  of  regular  re-evaluation,  these  new 
needs were overlooked by the MSF team.  
In Cameroon, a first assessment carried out in April 2006 did not reveal emergency needs. 
More than one year later, a new MSF assessment detected a critical humanitarian situation 
with mortality rates above the emergency threshold and a high level of acute malnutrition.  
 
Mobility of displaced populations  
In many settings, displaced populations move from one location to another. This happens for 
a variety of reasons: for protection, to seek livelihood opportunities or, more often, to find a 
better life. Migrants can be very mobile, particularly in big cities. Upon arrival, they generally 
find  accommodation  with  family  members,  and/or  members  of  their  community  of  origin. 
People then tend to move on to more appropriate, or stable, accommodation as soon as 
possible. Those who end up occupying public spaces illegally are often forced to move from 
one  area  to  another,  usually  towards  the  periphery  of  the  town.  This  is  common  in 
Johannesburg, Djibouti and in other urban migration settings.  
                                                  
3 http://msf.org.za/viewnews.php?n=622 
4 Other factors were: i) nomadic life style of the population, and ii) different cultural understanding of the 
nutrition problem. 
5 Non food item kits distributed in the beginning of the intervention by Solidarité, OXFAM and CARITAS.   17 
Multiple displacements in rural areas 
Displaced  populations  in  rural  areas  often  move  from  one  village  to  the  next,  e.g.  in 
DRC/Haut  Uélé.  There,  even  in  Dungu  town,  people  move  from  one  neighbourhood  to 
another in order to seek safety from LRA attacks. In Cameroon, new pockets of displacement 
often appeared very quickly. Such mobility represents a challenge in terms of response to 
the medical, humanitarian and protection needs of these people. On the medical side, it has 
implications for identifying locations for the provision of services (fixed or mobile clinics), as 
well  as  for  the  follow  up  of  patients  for  nutritional  care,  response  to  sexual  violence, 
treatment of chronic diseases, or overall outreach.  
 
Responding to violence in insecure urban areas  
Violence  is  often  an  additional  problem  in  urban  areas,  making  entire  neighbourhoods 
insecure  and  causing  extra  medical  and  protection  consequences for entire  communities 
trapped by violent outbreaks - migrants, as well as the local population.  
The  South  African  case  study  highlighted  the  challenge  of  responding  to  xenophobic 
violence,  which  is  a  constant  threat  in  the  country.  MSF  struggled  to  respond  to  recent 
episodes of violence in the townships. With the exception of Khayelitsha, where MSF has 
worked for many years on an HIV-AIDS programme, MSF is not known in the townships and 
has little network in those places. Without activities it is very difficult to establish and maintain 
an efficient network. Given the restricted access to such very insecure neighbourhoods, it is 
difficult to prepare for, and to respond to, violent events.  
 
Administrative constraints 
In  Djibouti,  the  authorities  were  formally  opposed  to  particular  targeting  of  the  migrant 
population and against offering free healthcare that contradicted the cost recovery system 
introduced in Djibouti in 2006. MSF’s registration in the country took longer than expected 
and  the  authorities  refused  MSF  movements  out  of  Djibouti  city.  This  meant  that  the 
assessments and activities for refugees and migrants proposed in the initial activity plan that 
was validated in September 2008 were still not implemented in 2009.  
 
Security constraints  
The security risks in DRC make it impossible for MSF teams to stay overnight, except in the 
few secured towns which  have a permanent presence of MONUC  and  FARC.  Therefore 
MSF  intervention  was  restricted  to  these  secured  areas,  with  rare  short  trips  to  other 
locations  (so  far  mainly  for  assessment),  although  humanitarian  needs  outside  of  these 
towns are enormous.  
In Pakistan, the security situation triggered a non-classical set up of the MSF programme. 
The international staff was forced to keep a low profile, and the national team were at the 
forefront of all activities. Accordingly, MSF made major efforts to recruit national staff and 
adopted a strategy of using small teams from local communities.  
Similarly  in  Northern Iraq,  security  constraints  prevented survey  and  distribution  in  some 
locations. In some ‘hot spots’, the team needed members of the Defence Forces of Kurdistan 
Region (Peshmerga) to maintain order during distributions. 
In Iraq and Pakistan, the high level of insecurity restricts humanitarian work, largely as a 
result of the political polarisation of aid. This poses an additional challenge to the perception 
of MSF as an independent, impartial and neutral organisation. 
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Box 4: Summary of operational challenges in open settings 
  Low income  Medium to high income 
Urban     
Examples  Djibouti,   Iraq, South Africa,  
Main operational challenges 
observed 
-  Relative invisibility 
-  Mobility of migrant 
population in the city 
-  Urban poor are as 
vulnerable as migrants 
-  Cost recovery system 
makes health care 
unaffordable to vulnerable 
patients 
 
-  Identifying the most 
vulnerable 
-  Displaced population as 
vulnerable as poor host 
population 
-  Access to areas affected 
by criminal/gang violence 
-  Adapting MSF response 
to standards of a middle-
income country 
-  Dealing with chronic 
illnesses 
Rural     
Examples  DRC, Cameroun  Pakistan 
Main operational challenges 
observed 
-  Geographical spread of 
the affected population –
difficult to identify and reach 
-  Rapidly changing 
humanitarian situation and 
population needs –multiple 
displacements 
-  Coping mechanisms 
diminish over time 
-  Engagement with 
existing health system  
-  Supply difficulties – 
inaccessible roads due to 
insecurity, lack of airstrip, 
bad road conditions 
-  Targeting the most 
vulnerable in a massive 
displacement – geographical 
spread and huge needs 
-  Access to quality care 
for all IDPs. Different actors 
claiming to provide 
healthcare but quality not 
assured.  
-  Supply difficulties - 
managing an enormous 
emergency with local 
supplies 
 
Challenges, general  -  Indicators to benchmark the crisis 
-  Counting and mapping the affected population 
-  Quantifying the needs 
-  Criteria and indicators for engagement with the health 
  system  
-  Criteria for exit in protracted crises 
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4  ASSESSMENTS 
 
Assessment is a vital element of the program-planning process. Assessment provides 
the information on which decision should be made. Whilst good information does not 
guarantee a good program, poor information almost certainly guarantees a bad one. 
Curiosity and rigour are the essential elements of an emergency assessment. 
(IFRC, 2008) 
 
This chapter starts with a review of internal and external assessment tools; it describes the 
main findings and draws conclusions on those. Immediate comments to findings are written 
in  italic.  The  appropriateness  of  assessment  was  looked  at  in  terms  of  i)  quality  and 
completeness of information obtained, ii) the analysis and use of the obtained information for 
intervention design, iii) the application of quantitative and qualitative assessment methods 
and tools. The chapter closes with conclusions and recommendations on assessment. 
The rapid health assessment of refugee or displaced populations and Refugee health were 
used as internal references for the analysis. Additionally, IFRC guideline for assessment in 
emergencies was used as external reference. 
 
Box 5: Glossary on assessment:  
Tools refers to existing assessment guidelines, practical checklists and technical frameworks, An 
overview of assessment tools is provided below, the summary of reviewed assessment tools can be 
found in Annex 4. 
Methods refers to any systematic quantitative or qualitative ways to collect and analyse data. An 
overview of assessment methods is provided in Annex 5. 
Assessment  is  a  process  of  gaining  an  understanding  of  a  situation  in  order  to  identify  the 
problems, their sources and consequences (IFRC, 2008) 
Monitoring is continuous observation of the project/programme’s progress (IFRC, 2008) 
Initial assessment is considered the first of the top ten priorities in the response to the acute phase 
of an emergency involving population displacement (MSF, 1997). It should cover, as objectively as 
possible, the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the situation. Because the collection of reliable 
data  requires  time,  particularly  quantified  data  that  has  to  be  compiled  by  surveys,  the  initial 
assessment may be undertaken in two steps, a first rapid assessment for immediate action (initial 
exploratory mission) and in-depth assessment. Rapid health assessment is usually carried out in 
the  second  phase  of  the  assessment.  The  time  needed  to  complete  both  phases  of  the  initial 
assessment  will  depend  on  many  factors,  but  in  most  situations  necessary  information  may  be 
gathered within 7 to 10 days. (MSF, 1997) 
Initial exploratory mission (first rapid assessment) should result in a rapid decision on whether or 
not to intervene and the type and the size of intervention needed. The information collected should 
indicate the severity of the situation, as well as the need and feasibility of relief intervention. These 
data are obtained by fast, simple methods: direct observation, interviews with refugees, agencies 
present in the area, the Ministry of Health (MoH) and local authorities, health data from medical 
facilities, and, if required, a rapid estimation of the population size by mapping. This phase can be 
completed in less than three days. (MSF, 1997)  
Rapid health assessment (RHA) refers to collection and analysis of information concerning the 
demography, mortality, morbidity, nutritional status and immunisation of the concerned population, 
as well as food, water and basic living conditions. RHA are generally carried out at the start of an 
intervention, together with the first operational activities. They rapidly provide data on the size of the 
population, health priorities and vital needs. This information may be obtained from a sample survey,   20 
from data collected at distribution points or from other methods, notably for demographic related 
information.  The  information  collected  is  used  to  calculate  indicators,  which  are  compared  to 
internationally accepted standards. The immediate implementation of a basic surveillance system 
provides  a  mechanism  to  further  monitor  the  ongoing  situation  as  well  as  the  impact  of  the 
interventions. (MSF/Epicentre, 2006). 
Continual  assessment  involves  regularly  updating  information  on  the  situation  and  seeking 
relevant feedback from beneficiaries in order to facilitate decision-making on long-term activities 
(IFRC, 2008) 
Assessment  fatigue  may  occur  when  an  area  has  been  assessed  many  times  by  different 
agencies.  The  people  are  frustrated  because  they  are  expected  to  answer  the  same  questions 
repeatedly, often with no obvious result. Under such circumstances, an assessment is unlikely to 
produce useful information (IFRC, 2008).  
Vulnerability  is  defined  as  the  conditions  determined  by  physical,  social,  social,  economic, 
environmental and political factors or processes which increase the susceptibility of a community to 
the impact of shocks/hazards. (IFRC, 2008) 
Capacity  is  defined  as “The  resources  of  individuals,  households,  communities,  institutions and 
nations to resist the impact of a hazard.” (IFRC, 2008) 
Coping strategies are those chosen by people as a way of living through difficult times. 
  
 
4.1  MSF assessment tools 
 
The  evaluation  team  reviewed  the  following  MSF  tools  available  for  assessments  in 
situations involving population displacement: 
I.Rapid Health Assessment of Refugee or Displaced Populations, MSF/Epicentre, 3
rd 
version, 2006 
II.Refugee Health: An Approach to Emergency Situations, MSF,1997 
III.Manual for the Assessment of Health and Humanitarian Emergencies, MSF Holland, 
2002  
IV.The  Priorities  (Checklists,  Indicators,  Standards):  Situations  with  Population 
Displacements OCB, 2009 
V.Assessment Grids, MSF Switzerland, 2001 
VI.Guide to using qualitative methods, MSF UK, 2002
6  
 
For the purpose of this evaluation, the content of the tools was reviewed, their use in the 
reviewed projects started and the main limitations of their use in open settings described. 
This chapter briefly presents the content of each tool; summary tables on the most important 
assessment methods and on the reviewed tools can be found in Annex 4 and 5.  
  
·  Rapid Health Assessment was designed for people wishing to carry out an emergency 
assessment  of  the  health  status  of  displaced  populations.  It  is  composed  of  the 
framework for rapid health assessments, presentation of objectives and methods, areas 
of  assessment  with  corresponding  indicators  and  recommendations  for  carrying  out 
these assessments. It also provides practical guidance on various quantitative methods 
(sample survey, counting of habitats, mapping, etc.). This practical guide remains of 
great value for camps or camp like setting. However, its use by non-epidemiologists in 
                                                  
6 This is a good reference guide on how to systematically use qualitative methods, a subject which is not 
covered in the other references reviewed.  
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rural dispersed and urban settings is challenging. The main method presented to collect 
the data during RHA is community sample survey. It is widely argued that community 
surveys in such complex settings clearly require epidemiological expertise and the use 
of “cookbook” methodologies has been discouraged by experts (Spiegel, 2007). At the 
other hand, description of more simple (“quick and dirty”) methods could serve the field 
teams  to  obtain  some  quantitative  data  in  situations  where  the  organization  of  the 
community survey is impractical.  
 
·  Refugee  Health  considers  initial  assessment  as  one  of  the  top  ten  priorities  of 
intervention in a displaced population. It foresees the assessment in two phases: i) a 
first rapid assessment for immediate action, and ii) a second assessment to provide 
more comprehensive information. It emphasises the need to collect both quantitative 
and qualitative information during assessment and briefly presents different methods 
used in an assessment. Its descriptive character limits its practical use.  
 
·  Manual  for  the  Assessment  of  Health  and  Humanitarian  Emergencies  is  a 
comprehensive manual on assessment in an emergency situation, but is not specific to 
displacement.  It  considers  seven  steps:  i)  planning  the  assessment;  ii)  initial 
assessment (data collection); iii) first conclusions and identification of areas for in-depth 
assessment;  iv)  surveillance;  v)  in-depth  assessment;  vi)  analysis;  vii)  report  and 
recommendations.  It  contains  checklists,  a  sample  report  format  and  provides  the 
support for data analysis (both quantitative and qualitative). Because of its modular 
structure,  it  appears  to  be  the  best  suited  tool  for  displacement  in  open  settings, 
however  prior  training  on  assessment  steps  and  methods  may  be  needed  for 
appropriate use.  
 
·  The Priorities is not a true guide, but rather a practical reminder with checklists of data 
to be collected during an initial assessment. The book is based on the top priorities and 
illustrates simple data collection frames. This guideline enjoys high popularity among 
the assessment teams for its user friendly character. However, for assessment design 
and different methods, other tools need to be consulted.  
 
·  The  MSF  UK  Guide  to  using  qualitative  research  methodology  is  designed  to  help 
people to become familiar with and use qualitative methods, and to ensure that those 
methods  produce  a  credible  result.  It  is  divided  into  four  parts,  starting  with  the 
definition  of  qualitative  methods  and  practical  applications.  It  covers  the  necessary 
approach, sampling methods, data collection and analysis. It is a very valuable tool with 
great potential for use in open settings.  
 
4.2  External assessment tools 
A number of agencies have developed their own assessment tools, yet there is hardly any 
specific tool for displacement in open settings. Out of ten selected assessment tools (see 
Annex 4), most of them are emergency assessment tools, but not specifically for displaced 
populations (except the Rapid Response Mechanism used by Solidarité). In terms of health 
assessment, most of the organisations interviewed said that they use MSF guidelines.  
·  In March 2009, humanitarian stakeholders met in Geneva to discuss how to improve 
cross-sector  needs  assessment  in  a  collaborative,  consultative  and  coordinated 
manner. Based on these discussions, the IASC Working Group decided to establish a 
Needs  Assessment  Task  Force  (NATF).  A  new  initiative,  ACAPS  (Assessment 
Capacities) will support the NATF in the identification, design and adaptation of existing 
tools for assessments.7 The NATF has compiled a list of all assessment tools (116) 
                                                  
7  ACAPS  is  being  set  up  under  the  auspices  of  the  Inter-Agency  Standing  Committee  (IASC)  Needs 
Assessment Task Force (NATF). The project is a joint initiative of the NATF (represented by OCHA) and a   22 
they have gathered so far. One outstanding tool is the Guidance on IDP Profiling by 
IDMC. It has been developed to collect data on IDPs, their condition and vulnerability. 
An IDP profile is an overview of an IDP population that shows, at a minimum: i) number 
of  displaced  persons,  disaggregated  by  age  and  sex  (even  if  only  estimates);  ii) 
location/s; and in addition (optional and not limited to these); ii) causes of displacement; 
iv) patterns of displacement; v) protection concerns; v) humanitarian needs; and vi) 
potential solutions for the group / individual, if available. The tool proposes different 
methodologies (both quantitative and qualitative) and provides advice on where to use 
which methodology. It also examines how to obtain a better picture of who and where 
the IDPs are, the difficulties of distinguishing them from surrounding communities and 
how  to  compile  workable  estimates  for  programming,  protection  and  advocacy 
purposes.  
 
·  The  Good  Enough  Guide:  Impact  Measurement  and  Accountability  in  Emergencies 
provides another useful tool for profiling beneficiaries and identifying vulnerabilities. It 
contains a basic tool with suggested questions for assessment of vulnerabilities (p 36).  
 
·  The IFRC Guidelines for Assessment in Emergencies are based on the principle of 
identification  of  vulnerabilities  and  capacities.  The  guidelines  addresses  continual 
assessment in addition to rapid and detailed assessments. They contain an interesting 
flowchart on vulnerability that can be found in annex 6. 
 
·  The HPG and ODI report According to needs? published in 2003, presents the results 
of one year-long study on the link between needs assessment and decision-making in 
the humanitarian sector. The study recommends that instead of an analysis based on 
ambiguous concept of need, one should be based on acute risk, understood as product 
of actual or imminent threats and vulnerabilities. The reports also deals with practice of 
needs  assessment,  identification  of  vulnerable  groups  targeting,  prioritisation  and 
decision-making, including general criteria for good practice.  
 
·  Analysing Disrupted Health Sectors is a modular manual published recently by WHO 
providing guidance for analysis of health sector in crisis. It presents patterns recurring 
in disrupted health sectors and provides instruments for data collection and analysis 
with common pitfalls and the ways to overcome them. 
 
·  Practical information on epidemiological tools used in rapid assessments, surveys and 
surveillance  can  be  also  consulted  on  LSHTM  website: 
conflict.lshtm.ac.uk/page_02.htm. 
                                                                                                                                                     
consortium  of  NGOs  –  HelpAge  International,  Merlin  and  NRC.  Key  partners  will  include  the  Overseas 
Development Institute, Tufts University, the Karolinska Institute, Columbia University and, relating specifically 
to building in-country capacities, the Emergency Capacity Building Project (ECB).   23 
4.3  Findings on assessments  
Initial  assessments  were  reviewed  for  all  interventions  evaluated;  in  addition  other 
assessments carried out before or during the intervention were looked at. Initial assessment 
was carried out prior to intervention in all cases. The Pakistan assessment was excluded as 
it was only documented for the assessments in and not outside the camps. Many findings are 
not specific to displacement in open settings; however where considered relevant for the 
analysis, they are presented briefly. The specific details for each assessment / country can 
be found in part II of this report.  
 
Critical aspects of information missing in assessments 
Initial assessments varied considerably in the type of information they provided. While the 
geopolitical context was well described in all the reports, specific findings on health and food 
were sometimes insufficiently elaborated; water, shelter and NFI were the least developed 
findings. Mortality rates were initially only estimated in Cameroon (based on grave counting), 
and in later stages also in Djibouti and DRC (based on a cross-sectional two-stage cluster 
sample survey). Estimates of population size and population movements were rather rough 
in all assessments, except for Cameroon. Mapping of displaced people was incomplete, and 
specific vulnerable groups were not identified. The presence and activities of international 
actors were generally well described. Except for South Africa, there was no information on 
local organisations. Socio-cultural aspects were underreported.  
Evaluators  believe  that  the  information  gap  in  reviewed  assessments  was  linked  to  the 
complexity  of  the  situations  evaluated  and  the  fact  that  assessment  techniques  are  not 
adapted to these realities. Providing population estimates and mapping of displaced people 
seems particularly challenging for the assessment teams, and reflects the difficulty of using 
quantitative methods in these settings. The information gaps on water, shelter and NFI might 
be related to the difficulty of quantifying these needs, but also to the lack of internationally 
standardised indicators to which the findings can be compared. Regarding the identification 
of specific vulnerabilities, it is suggested that currently used assessment methods are not 
appropriate to reach this objective. These particular issues are discussed further at a later 
stage in this chapter.  
Assessments in open settings take longer  
All the assessments were rather long when compared to the reference (MSF, 1997) which 
suggests 3 days for initial exploratory mission, and 7 to 10 days for the in-depth assessment. 
In  reality  assessments  took  between  6  days  and  one  month.  Nevertheless  due  to  the 
complexity of the situation, longer assessments seem to be needed in open settings. 
Decision making informed by poor qualitative data  
Qualitative methods were used in all the initial assessments, sometimes unknowingly, and 
often  as  the  only  alternative  when  quantitative  data  could  not  be  obtained.  Therefore, 
operational decision making was mainly based on (poor) qualitative data provided by the 
initial exploratory teams.  
Unlike with surveys, the exact qualitative methodology was never described. Assessment 
teams seem to experience difficulties in analysing qualitative data and interpreting findings. 
Data  were  also  not  scrutinised  in  terms  of  reliability,  accuracy,  completeness  and 
consistency.  There  was  no  information  on  how  the  results  were  validated  by  different 
methods. Potential bias and errors are not mentioned. 
Certain qualitative methods such as group interviewees and focus group discussions were 
under-used or under-reported in final reports.    24 
In DRC, a good balance of both qualitative and quantitative methods was used during the 
initial assessment. However, the findings obtained by interviews were under-represented in 
the report.  
In Djibouti an ‘Interview dossier’ brought valuable information about specific problems facing 
the displaced. However, the information collected in interviews was not reflected in the final 
report, and therefore ‘lost’ as most of the readers (HQ, coordination, and field) overlooked 
the annexes. 
Whilst a different level of rigour is required for the application of qualitative methods in 
day to day activities from that required for research, a more thorough approach to the 
application of qualitative methods on a day to day basis will result in less biased 
results – meaning we can have more confidence in both them and our response. 
(MSF UK, 2007) 
Confusion around the concept of rapid health assessment (RHA)  
RHA as a part of initial assessment was only carried out in Iraq. RHA was also conducted in 
Doruma (DRC), 6 months after the start of the intervention. Both RHA were carried out by 
EPICENTRE and a community sample survey was the main method of data collection.  
Evaluators  observed  that  field  teams  were  not  comfortable  performing  rapid  health 
assessments. On one  hand  this might be  due  to  the complexity  of conducting a  sample 
surveys in open setting, while it still remains the first method suggested in the MSF Rapid 
Health Assessment. On the other hand teams seemed not familiar with more simple methods 
that could be used during the RHA. 
Concerns on the use of community sample surveys 
With  various  objectives  and  at  different  stages  of  the  interventions,  community  sample 
surveys  were  carried  out  in  4  out  of  6  reviewed  projects.  EPICENTRE  was  involved  in 
Cameroon, and DRC; an MSF epidemiologist carried out the survey in Djibouti and MSF 
team continued the survey based on initial RHA in Iraq. All surveys provided good quality 
information; however  some  concerns  appeared regarding  the representativity, justification 
and utility of these rather costly exercises. The details can be found in Annex 7. 
In Iraq, one of the objectives of the RHA was to identify the target population for the NFI 
distribution.  As  this  was  not  achieved  after  the  first  exercise,  the  team  continued  an 
exhaustive survey through the intervention to identify the beneficiaries for the distribution. 
Despite the focus of the intervention on NFI distribution, an initial questionnaire including 
health  related  data  was  administrated.  This  approach  is  questionable  as  most  of  the 
information collected was not used neither for operational nor for advocacy purposes. 
The objectives of DRC survey were comprehensive and adapted to the context, investigating 
access to health care, main health seeking behaviours, people’s livelihoods, their disruption 
and existing coping mechanisms. The consideration of both displaced and host community 
can be considered good practice. Additionally, a focus group discussion was carried out, 
providing an insight into the problem of access to health care. However, due to compromised 
access to the affected population with less than 20% included in the sampling frame and lack 
of  homogeneity  among  the  displacement  sites,  the  results  of  the  survey  cannot  be 
generalized  beyond  the  sampled  population  (see  Box  for  more  details).  Moreover, 
prospective mortality surveillance, even though recommended by survey team, was not set 
up after the survey, thus the trend of mortality and therefore the evolution of the crisis, could 
not be observed.    25 
Retrospective mortality was estimated in all surveys, except in Iraq. Prospective mortality 
surveillance  was  only  set  up  in  Cameroon,  but  even  there,  probably  due  to  inadequate 
supervision, it showed implausible low mortality rates
8. 
Nutritional surveys were conducted in Djibouti and Cameroon; but in both countries UNICEF 
already  described  a  critical  nutritional  situation  prior  to  the  MSF  survey  (using  similar 
methodology with better coverage). On the other hand, no nutritional survey was carried out 
in  DRC,  even  though  the  problem  of  food  insecurity  was  detected  and  no  data  on 
malnutrition was available
9.  
In  addition,  all  surveys  (except  Iraq)  were  conducted  after  the  operational  strategy  was 
designed and it is not clear how much the results served to fine tune the already defined 
strategy. Additionally, it appears that the limited involvement of MSF teams in these surveys 
results in weak appropriation of the results and limited follow up of the recommendations.  
 
Box 6: Example of DRC (Haut Uele) 
Six months after the onset of the crisis in Haut Uélé District in DRC, a two-stage cluster sample survey 
was  carried  out  in  Dungu  town  (Muller,  2009)  and  partially  (rapid  evaluation  only)  in  the  town  of 
Doruma. Initially, several rural places hosting large numbers of IDPs were included, but due to security 
constraints, the survey took place only in Dungu and Doruma towns.  
The survey highlighted the widespread violence in the region. In Dungu, between Christmas 2008 and 
the survey day, the crude mortality rate was 1.9 (95 per cent CI 0.9-2.9). Sixty-five per cent of the 
deaths were caused by violence. In Doruma, a peak of crude mortality rate of 5.4 persons per 10,000 
per day was registered in the period after Christmas. Of all reported deaths, 92 per cent were due to 
violence.  
The  survey  showed  that  both  host  and  displaced  populations  were  living  in  precarious  conditions 
because of violence, theft of cattle and other belongings, destruction of houses, and restricted access 
to their land. Supplies and assistance from NGOs were insufficient, mainly due to the constraints of 
working in the area, and water and sanitation conditions were below humanitarian standards. Access 
to healthcare in Doruma  was considered to be relatively good; however fees for consultation and 
treatment in Dungu represented an important barrier.
10 
Thus the survey provided relevant information but it also demonstrated significant weaknesses. As it 
was only able to assess the conditions of the population living in the most accessible areas with the 
highest presence of international actors, it was only representative of a very small proportion of the 
affected population. It could only provide a snapshot of the rapidly changing environment, and very 
likely did not capture any “pockets of vulnerability”, nor patterns of mortality over time.11 Moreover, in 
the absence of additional mortality estimates coming from other surveys or prospective surveillance, 
these figures are difficult to interpret and provide little information about the magnitude of the crisis, its 
dynamic and the adequacy of the assistance. 
 
                                                  
8CMR of 0.14/10 000/day and U5MR of 0.25/10 000/day were reported in the MSF 2nd Quarterly report 
2008, Cameroon. 
9 Nutritional screening was suggested by Epicentre, but the recommendations were not followed. 
10 It appears that the influx of IDPs in Dungu produced stock ruptures to which health centres responded by 
buying drugs at private pharmacies and by charging patients for their cost. 
11 The prospective (real-time) mortality surveillance was not set up in the affected area due to problems of 
training and supervision of staff because of geographical spread and security constraints.   26 
Quality of assessment determines quality of response 
Inappropriate assessments in open settings are more likely to result in wrong decisions being 
taken  on  whether  to  start  or  not  to  start  an  intervention.  They  might  also  lead  to  an 
inappropriate  intervention  strategy.  The  example  of  Cameroon  showed  that  even  an 
experienced  team  ‘understanding  the  emergency  situation  correctly’  did  not  succeed  in 
arguing for an intervention without the presentation of rigorous findings.  
DRC / Haut Uélé is a striking example of a mission where a series of assessments has been 
conducted without finding a clear intervention strategy. Although several factors contributed 
to the poor response, the evaluation team is convinced that the quality of assessments is an 
important  one.  A  comprehensive  and  sound  assessment  of  needs,  capacities  and 
vulnerabilities is indispensable for a targeted and effective intervention.  
Views of IDPs are gravely omitted 
Few  of  the  assessments  reviewed  (South  Africa,  and  partially  Djibouti  and  Cameroon) 
systematically  included  the  views  and  perspectives  of  displaced  or  ensured  their  active 
participation during the assessment. This was commonly justified by lack of time during the 
assessment, the priority being put on interviews with key informants, such as community 
leaders and health personnel. It was also argued that information provided by the displaced 
tends  to  be  inaccurate,  because  the  problems  and  needs  are  often  exaggerated  in 
expectation of assistance. 
Humanitarian organisations see people as victims; assessments are needs focused, 
capacity analysis is forgotten. We need to understand who are the most vulnerable 
and what makes them so. A more active role needs to be attributed to the affected 
population. They should be seen more as active actors, ‘primary stake holders’ rather 
than passive beneficiaries.  
(IFRC, 2008) 
External sources of information are under-used 
During the assessments, MSF tends to underestimate the information that can be obtained 
from other sources. Information already existing in the field (authorities, other actors, etc) is 
often  under-used  which  leads  to  duplication  of  efforts  and  loss  of  time  during  the 
assessments. As is well known, repetitive assessments lead to assessment fatigue and in 
some cases might delay the intervention.  
Sound assessment provides solid findings 
In Cameroon, recommendations of the first assessment proposing a small scale intervention 
were not followed, probably because of a failure to demonstrate clear emergency needs in 
the area. This might be due to numerous factors - complexity of the situation with the spread 
of refugees over a large geographical area, no recognition of the problems of refugees by the 
authorities, but also because of poor diversity of methods leading to incomplete findings and 
an assessment focus on security and context analysis. Despite a comparable timeframe, the 
second  assessment  provided  much  more  solid  results.  This  is  considered  to  be  due  to 
comprehensive methodology mixing quantitative and qualitative methods and involving the 
refugee population, but also because of better knowledge of the area related to the presence 
of  other  actors,  recognition  of  the  problems  of  refugees  by  the  authorities,  and  better 
realisation of the needs due to the increased number of refugees.  
Poor follow-up leads to critical delays on intervention 
More  than  a  year  passed  between  the  first  and  second  assessment  in  Cameroon  (see 
above). A major conclusion drawn from the second assessment was that it was conducted 
too  late  and  an  earlier  re-assessment  and  intervention  could  have  prevented  the 
deterioration of the humanitarian situation (nutritional status and mortality rate).    27 
Strong but very subjective conclusions and recommendations 
In many of the initial exploratory missions, the teams seemed to be lead by their common 
sense and personal experience, while there was an apparent lack of sound methodology. 
Consequently, experienced teams present strong conclusions even in the absence of solid 
findings in written reports.
12 On the other hand, less experienced teams tend to present timid 
recommendations despite well elaborated findings.
13  
Specific expertise in the assessment team can be a necessity 
Most of the assessment can be carried out by ‘generalists’, who are experienced and skilled 
in assessment, but with no specific technical background; in some situations the support of 
other specialists appears necessary. Including an anthropologist in the assessment team in 
Djibouti or psychologist in DRC would have been beneficial. The involvement of a lawyer in 
the assessment in South Africa and participation of a psychologist in Djibouti are positive 
examples.  
Lack of frameworks for defining the most vulnerable 
Although there is broad consensus that MSF should be aiming to assist the most vulnerable, 
there is little knowhow and practice of actually defining these groups. A number of lessons 
can be drawn from the reviewed interventions.  
Geographical targeting was considered a good choice in Djibouti. By targeting the poorest 
areas of the city, MSF today finds that 50% of beneficiaries are migrants. However, little was 
done to describe the specific vulnerabilities of both populations.  
In Iraq, identifying the most vulnerable by a door-to-door survey was time (and resources) 
consuming. As an alternative, MSF team tried to use an official list of vulnerable families 
provided by national authorities, however, the team realised that the list did not include the 
most  vulnerable  IDPs  as  it  was  out-of-date  and  that  some  IDPs  preferred  not  to  be 
registered. Accordingly, the team re-started a door-to-door survey. Through the intervention, 
MSF team discovered specific factors of vulnerability: a) recent IDPs were considerably more 
vulnerable than ‘old’ IDPs; b) poor IDPs concentrated in rural areas rather than in big towns 
(cheaper  rent);  c)  a  high  number  of  females  living  in  a  household  made  the  household 
vulnerable  because  of  limited  working  opportunities  for  women;  and  d)  female-headed 
households were particularly vulnerable. 
In  Pakistan,  teams  relied  on  information  provided  by  community  leaders.  National  staff 
formed small teams to explore the region and identify communities with a large number of 
displaced and/or the most economically vulnerable.  
In South Africa, MSF still reaches only the most visible among the three million Zimbabwean 
migrants in the country. The teams made major efforts to access the most vulnerable through 
mobile clinics in typical illegal work places (rural areas) or poor urban neighbourhoods. Still, 
there is no certainty that the most vulnerable really live in the places identified today.  
                                                  
12 Example of first assessment in Cameroon, April 2006 
13 Example of Bangadi assessment, November 2009   28 
4.4  Discussion/ Conclusions 
Use of existing tools possible, assessment frame to be tailored to specific context 
Even  though  none  of  the  internal  assessment  tools  reviewed  is  specifically  designed  for 
displacement in open setting, all of them - with some limitations - can be applicable in open 
settings. The best suited assessment tool appears MSF-H Manual for the assessment of 
Health and Humanitarian Emergencies. This comprehensive and self explanatory guideline 
presents a wide range of qualitative and quantitative methods and gives space for adaptation 
to various contexts.  
 
Assessment  in  open  setting  needs  to  remain  flexible  for  the  many  different  situations. 
Appropriate methodology needs to be selected according to the context, giving maximum 
consideration to:  
-  Type of displacement, urgency of the situation and existing constraints (time, access, 
security) 
-  Good diversification and complementary use of quantitative and qualitative methods, 
allowing cross-checking (triangulation) of information from different sources 
-  Systematic  use  of  qualitative  methods,  which  are  more  suitable  for  identifying 
particular vulnerability 
-  Alternative methods to sample surveys in order to collect quantitative data 
-  Population perceived needs to be represented 
-  More  rigor  in  the  methodology  and  better/standardised  reporting  to  allow  the 
comparison with previous assessments 
-  Continual  assessment  to  detect  the  changes  quickly  and  adapt  intervention 
accordingly 
Continual assessment is a necessity 
Currently used MSF guidelines, are focusing on initial assessment, which is assumed to be 
followed by prospective surveillance and monitoring. However, as observed in reviewed case 
studies,  -  with  the  humanitarian  situation  considerably  changing  over  time  -  multiple 
assessments are carried out and actual intervention is often delaying.  
 
In  order  to  quickly  adapt  intervention  to  changes,  and  also  rationalise  the  information 
collected,  it  is  suggested  to  adopt  the  concept  of  continual  assessment.  Within  an 
intervention area, prospective surveillance (community based and through health structures) 
should  be  systematically  implemented  and  be  seen  as  integral  of  such  assessment. 
Additionally, continual assessment will cover the new sites of displacement as they appear.  
Existing local networks should be used or – if not possible - new ones established to feed 
information  into  the  continual  assessment.  This  has  partially  been  done  in  some  of  the 
projects, but clearer objectives and better feed-back into project planning is needed. These 
networks must be representative of the entire population they serve
14.  
 
Teams  specifically  devoted  to  assessment  might  be  needed  in  constantly  changing 
environments. In order to optimize resources and maximize impact, based on example of 
PUC and PUB in DRC
15, such assessment & rapid response teams could play a key role in 
continual assessment.  
                                                  
14 In DRC and Djibouti, CHW were only from non displaced population. 
15 PUC: Emergency pool Congo (OCB), PUB: emergency pool Bunia (OCG) with a key objective of rapid 
assessment and short term intervention during various emergency situations   29 
Health system, barriers of access and health seeking behaviour must be explored 
In emergencies presenting as acute and/or camp-like situations in which standard sets of 
internationally  accepted  indicators  (MSF/Epicentre,  2006)  may  be  applied,  the  process 
between the assessment and intervention is quite straightforward, as tools and strategies are 
available  and  can  be  implemented  immediately,  even  with  a  minimum  of  information 
available. In these situations even poor findings of initial exploratory mission will have little 
effect on the quality of the intervention. It can be rapidly informed/corrected by a rapid health 
assessment (which remains of key importance in these situations) or by operational updates 
provided by the teams present in the field.  
 
In none of the reviewed cases such a straightforward assessment to intervention process 
appeared  either  feasible  or  appropriate.  In  all  these  situations,  displaced  settled  in 
environment with some existing resources and to different extent functioning health system. 
In  these  circumstances,  in  addition  to  needs  assessment,  it  is  essential  to  evaluate  the 
performance of such system and explore the patterns of health seeking behaviour and main 
barriers  of  access  in  order  to  decide  the  best  suited  medical  strategy.  While  such 
assessment  efforts  are  important  to  define  intervention  strategies,  they  must  not  delay 
response to apparent emergency needs.  
Need for better understanding of vulnerability, capacity and coping 
Today, MSF is paying little attention in to the concepts of vulnerability, capacity and coping. 
The  evaluators  argue  that  a  thorough  assessment  including  these  concepts  is  of  crucial 
importance.  Particularly  where  situations  of  displacement  in  open  setting  present  as 
prolonged crises with blurred distinction between emergency and post-emergency phase. It 
is essential to understand the extent to which adopted coping strategies cover the needs. 
Such will allow to decide on meaningful intervention strategies (present and future), taking 
into consideration that the coping strategies tend to diminish in prolonged crises. 
 
More  systematic  use  of  qualitative  assessment  methods  is  required  to  understand  the 
diverse vulnerabilities and needs. A participative approach including both displaced and host 
population should be privileged. MSF needs to actively consult the people affected, talk to 
the communities and actively seek out marginalized groups to ensure that their interests are 
taken into account. Concepts of vulnerability, capacity and coping go beyond the current 
MSF expertise. It is suggested to consult external sources familiar with these subjects, such 
as IFRC or IDMC.  
 
The nature of hosting transmits vulnerability from displaced to host.  
(McDowell,2008) 
Use of rapid health assessments and surveys in open setting calls for revision 
Although both qualitative and quantitative methods are recommended and used for initial 
assessments, quantitative information still has a much higher credibility in MSF. There was 
an almost systematic use of community sample surveys and little attention/credibility paid to 
qualitative  information.  The  availability  of  reliable  quantitative  data  is  often  poor  in  open 
setting, especially in the beginning of the crisis. Assessment teams experienced difficulties in 
obtaining simple quantitative data – e.g. on population size and structure, on mortality or 
quantification of vital needs.  
In absence of reliable quantitative data, community sample surveys were carried out at later 
stage  of  the  projects.  Even  though  technical  expertise  was  provided  by  EPICENTRE  or 
experienced epidemiologist,  some  limitations were  observed while using  surveys  in open 
settings (see the following chapter on mortality).  
Evaluators  argue  that  the  use  of  RHA  and  surveys  in  open  setting  calls  for  revision.  In 
reviewed interventions, an initial RHA was rarely performed and the surveys were done at   30 
later  stages,  following  general  assessments,  when  the  intervention  strategy  had  already 
been  defined.  The  results  of  the  surveys  were  used  for  lobbying  purposes  (Cameroon), 
convincing MSF teams about the needs (Djibouti, DRC) or identification of target population 
for NFI distribution (Iraq).  
Assessment teams need to be trained to perform RHA using simpler methods in situations 
when  epidemiological  expertise  is  not  available  and/or  sample  surveys  do  not  seem 
appropriate.  Such  training  needs  to  address  the  estimation  of  population  figures  and 
mapping  using  methods  adapted  to  dispersed  populations  and  urban  settings,  such  as 
remote sensing.  
Difficult use of mortality as prime indicator in open settings 
In  the  situations  with  displacement  of  population,  crude  and  under-5  mortalities  (CMR, 
U5MR)  are  considered the key  indicators  to  evaluate  the magnitude  of  a  crisis
16and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  humanitarian  response.  From  the  six  interventions  reviewed  only  in 
Cameroun mortality was assessed retrospectively and prospective surveillance implemented. 
This may be partly explained by insufficient resources allocated, but also by the general 
difficulties to measure and interpret mortality rates (MR) in open settings.  
There are two principal methods for measuring mortality in a population: a) retrospective 
surveys which provide baseline information and b) prospective surveillance which monitors 
trends.  Even  though  surveys  can  be  carried  out  in  any  situation,  conducting  them  in 
extremely difficult/dangerous situations has limitations (and consequently leads to biases and 
imprecision) (WHO,  2009). In  general,  surveys  are  prone  to  sampling  biases  (population 
sampled smaller than target population due inaccessibility, outdated or imprecise population 
figures,  bad  sampling  design,  high  non  respondent  rates),  and  to  sample  imprecision 
(inadequate sample size, design effect due to cluster sampling) (Checchi/ Roberts, 2005). 
Additionally, retrospective mortality surveys are prone to important response biases due to 
inaccurate date recall, poor questionnaire design and intentional misreporting of deaths due 
to  fear,  stigma  or  expectation  of  assistance.  In  reviewed  surveys,  the  main  limitations 
observed were the sampling shortcomings related to insecurity and inaccessibility.  
Due to rapidly changing character of observed interventions, a one-off mortality survey might 
provide varying results depending on the timing it is performed. Such results are of little value 
in absence of prospective mortality surveillance to able to detect trends of mortality over 
time. As has been argued elsewhere, the prospective mortality surveillance is appropriate 
mostly for camp-dwelling or regimented populations as it needs a regular epidemiological 
supervision and its quality may not be sustainable over many months (Checchi/ Roberts, 
2005). 
In chronic crises (as open settings often represent), mortality rates of near-normal levels can 
gradually rise overtime or display peaks due to epidemics, exhausted livelihoods, collapsed 
health system, new waves of displacement and isolation from relief providers. Consequently, 
as the impact of an elevated CMR depends not only on its magnitude, but also on its duration 
and on the size of the population experiencing, such often-neglected crises can become as 
deadly as acute emergencies (Checchi/ Roberts, 2005). However, this was not demonstrated 
in reviewed interventions as the excess death toll was impossible to estimate in absence of 
baseline mortality data and of information on mortality trend.  
                                                  
16 Doubling of non-crisis (baseline) mortality is taken to define an emergency situation. Baseline, non-crisis 
CMRs in most of Sub-Sub-Saharan Africa are in the range 0.3-0.6 per 10 000 per day, with a probable 
current average of 0.44. Based on this, in 1990 Tool and Waldman suggested an approximate doubling of 
CMR (to 1 per 10 000 per day) as a useful threshold for formally declaring an emergency, at least from a 
health standpoint.    31 
Interpretation  of  MR  might  be  problematic  when  they  are  close  to  emergency  threshold, 
which  is  commonly  seen  in  open  setting,  as  higher  precision  is  needed
17  compared  to 
situation displaying high MR where achieving a very good precision is not essential.  
It is argued that in prolonged situations using an emergency threshold to benchmark the 
crisis might not be appropriate as these shows often only moderate elevation of mortality, but 
protracted and over a large population. Here, the excess death tolls might better reflect the 
magnitude of the crisis while evolution of mortality rates might reflect the trend (Salama/ 
Spiegel/ Talley/ Waldman, 2004) 
. 
Based on reviewed case studies and arguments from the literature, the evaluators conclude 
that using mortality as prime indicator to evaluate magnitude of the crisis and adequacy of 
assistance in situations with displacement in open setting is difficult. It will be essential to 
search  for  alternative  ways  to  measure  and  monitor  mortality,  and  to  identify  and  use 
alternative indicators (e.g. food security, access to health care and other basic needs, etc) in 
order to best judge the magnitude and evolution of crises when measurement of mortality is 
unpractical.  
A community-based network could play a key role in a mortality surveillance system, in order 
to monitor the evolution of a crisis, however considerable simplification of indicators to be 
collected and continuous effort of supervision would be needed  
When  conducting  the mortality  surveys,  an  expertise  should  be  guaranteed  to  overcome 
methodological challenges. Epicentre or other agencies experienced with the subject could 
be approached to discuss the recommended best practices and potential area of research.  
                                                  
17 For  example,  assuming  a  recall  period  of  six  months  and  cluster  sampling  with  design  effect  of 2.0, 
classifying a CMR of 1.1. per 10 000 per day as being unequivocally above the emergency threshold would 
require a precision of +/-0.1 per 10 000 per day (that is, a lower 95%CI bound not bellow 1.0), namely a 
sample of 46 953 households. 
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5  INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 
 
Present priorities and practices for healthcare provision in conflict settings are still 
broadly based on a model of humanitarian relief that was developed during the last 
two decades of the Cold War, when conflict was synonymous with overcrowded 
refugee camps sheltering young populations from developing countries. 
(Spiegel et al, 2010)  
 
MSF’s ambition in an emergency intervention is to make a solid impact in terms of decreased 
mortality.  As  health  services  (if  they  exist)  are  often  overwhelmed  or  have  deteriorated 
because of the crisis, it is common to run a parallel healthcare system. Priority is usually 
given to curative care of acute conditions and to prevention, detection and rapid response to 
disease outbreaks. 
In  comparison  to  camp-like  situations,  the  need  to  engage  with  the  existing  healthcare 
system is much greater in open settings. The establishment of parallel health systems has 
the  potential  to  raise  equity  issues  between  host  and  displaced  populations,  and  to 
undermine  quality  and  sustainability  of  healthcare  provision  (Rowley/  Burnham/  Drabe, 
2006). 
This chapter starts with an overview on MSF internal intervention tools as well as external 
guidelines  and  policies.  Findings  on  interventions  from  the  reviewed  case  studies  are 
described and conclusions on those follow.  
 
5.1  MSF intervention tools 
The intervention guides listed below were reviewed during the evaluation process: 
 
I.  Refugee Health: An Approach to Emergency Situations, MSF,1997 
II.  Organisation and Supervision of Outreach Programmes, MSF-Holland, 2009 
III.  The  Priorities  (Checklists,  Indicators,  Standards):  Displacement  situations,  OCB, 
2009  
IV.  Nutrition: Displacement situations , OCB, 2007 
V.  Shelter: Displacement situations , OCB, 2006 
VI.  Measles vaccination: Displacement situations, OCB, 2006  
VII.  Care for Victims of Sexual Violence: Displacement situations, OCB, 2007  
VIII.  Non  Food  Items  Distribution,  Emergencies  IDPs/Refugees  and  Natural  Disasters, 
OCB, 2009 
 
The review focused on the intervention strategies presented, and their use and applicability 
in the case studies on displacement in open settings included in this evaluation. Internally, 
Refugee Health remains the key reference for displacement situations. OCB has published a 
more updated version in the form of the ‘pocket guidelines (IV-VIII)’.. 
·  Refugee Health is based on MSF’s experience in refugee programmes. It deals with 
healthcare during the emergency phase of a refugee crisis, when priority is given to 
action  that aims to prevent or  reduce excess  mortality.  These  intervention  priorities 
have been labelled ‘The Top Ten Priorities.’ One separate chapter briefly addresses the 
post-emergency phase. It focuses on policies rather than on practical aspects, and is 
meant as a guide for decision-makers.  
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·  The  medical  intervention  strategy  presented  in  Refugee  Health  is  based  on  the 
objective  to  reduce  excess  mortality  and  morbidity  in  the  refugee  population  by 
ensuring appropriate medical care for all refugees and responding to epidemics. 
 
·  The ‘four levels healthcare model’18 (from community health workers to the referral 
hospital) is suggested as the most suitable to fulfil the above mentioned objective. The 
main focus is on curative services (early diagnosis and treatment of the main killers 
such as malaria, acute respiratory infections, diarrhoea and measles with malnutrition 
often  acting  as  an  aggravating  factor).  The  referral  flow  of  patients  between  the 
services is essential (see chart 1 below). 
 
Chart 1: Camp services and the referral flow of patients (MSF, 1997) 
 
A brief synopsis of the MSF guidelines reviewed is provided here; several tools have 
already been described in the Assessments chapter (see page 20). 
·  Organisation and Supervision of Outreach Programmes is a revised guideline designed 
for  project  coordinators,  medical  coordinators  and  outreach  work  supervisors  to  be 
used  as  practical  reference  for  decision  making  and  implementation  of  outreach 
programmes in different settings. It offers guidance, suggestions and examples related 
to the most important aspects of outreach programmes and aims to cover the principles 
of  organisation  and  supervision  of  outreach  programmes  depending  on  the  context 
setting and priorities of the project.  
 
·  The priorities presents checklists and indicators related to the Top Ten priorities and 
introduces five additional priorities: 11. Security, 12. Mental Health, 13. Protection, 14. 
Temoignage, 15. Proximity. 
 
·  Nutrition, Shelter, Measles Vaccination, Care for Victims of Sexual Violence and Non 
Food Items Distributions in Displacement Situations are the pockets guides developed 
by  OCB,  based  on  the  model  of  a  ‘quick  start  manual’.  They  are  part  of  a  series 
covering activities to be implemented in the first phase of an emergency (zero to three 
months). 
                                                  
18 4 Level health care system: 1. Home visitors 2. Health post 3. Health centre 4. Hospital.    34 
5.2  External intervention guidelines and policies 
In terms of policies and guidelines, a wealth of literature has recently been developed on the 
issue of urban contexts, and urban IDPs and refugees, with UNHCR taking the lead on this. 
Of particular interest is the review of UNHCR interventions for the Iraqi refugees in urban 
areas of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Linked to this review are the new UNHCR guidelines: 
Designing Appropriate Interventions in Urban Settings.  
 
·  UNHCR’s general position is that camps should be a last resort where there is no other 
choice, that aid should be provided in ways that take into account the living standards 
of surrounding communities, and that responses to host families should be improved. 
UNHCR’s ambition is to distribute aid more according to the criterion of vulnerability 
than simply the status of being displaced per se. UNHCR has recently set up a unit 
called  AGDM  –  Age,  Gender  and  Diversity  Mainstreaming  –  to  better  deal  with 
protection and assistance to vulnerable groups (Riera, 2010). UNICEF takes a similar 
position, aiming to strengthen traditional coping mechanisms.  
 
·  ALNAP developed some guidance on responding to urban disasters, although these do 
not  specifically  focus  on IDPs, but  on  disaster relief in cities. It includes interesting 
sections  on  comprehensive  needs  and  vulnerabilities  assessment;  effective 
coordination  and  partnership  and  communication;  engagement  and  participation  of 
local actors, shelter options.  
 
·  Public Health Equity in Refugee and other Displaced Persons Settings (UNHCR, 2010) 
explores key questions of cost and equity in the context of health services in those 
settings. It frames major operational questions that need to be addressed including the 
status of healthcare delivery, allocation of resources and strategies for transition and 
exit.  
 
·  Public  Health in Crisis-Affected  Populations is a practical guide for  decision-makers 
commissioned  and  published  by  Humanitarian  Practice  Network  (HPN)  and  the 
Overseas Development Institute (HPN, 2007) dealing with risks to health inherent in 
crises, and the potential impact of health interventions. Among five crisis conditions 
elaborated it deals with displacement into neighbouring host communities. Examples 
include  Lebanese  IDPs  during  the  2006  Israel-Hezbollah  war,  and  Sri  Lankans 
displaced by recent fighting. 
 
·  The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), together with others (including MSF), is in the 
process  of  finalizing  guidelines  entitled:  Assistance  in  Urban  Areas  to  Populations 
Affected by Humanitarian Crises. The particular focus of this is on shelter.  
 
·  The ICRC’s humanitarian response is guided by the degree of vulnerability and the 
essential needs of all people affected by armed conflict and violence – including IDPs 
(International Review of Red Cross, 2009). 
 
·  Oxfam’s  policy  considers  expanded  and  more  targeted  responses  to  assist  host 
families,  including  livelihoods  interventions.  At  the  programme  level,  a  recent  study 
suggests  that  livelihoods  interventions,  such  as  cash  transfers,  cash  for  work, 
vouchers,  increasing  market  access  and  emergency  micro-credit  could  play  an 
important  role  in  helping  host  families  and  IDPs  to  survive  (Oxfam  International 
Research Report, 2008). 
 
·  In  a  recent  Lancet  article  (January  23,  pp  341−345)  Paul  Spiegel  and  colleagues 
indicate changing trends on healthcare needs of people affected by conflict. To assist 
with  orientation  of  future  health  strategies,  policies,  and  interventions,  the  authors   35 
propose a matrix of three types of settings (camp-like, urban, rural-dispersed) and two 
income and life-expectancies (low and medium to high, see Annex 8). Based on this 
framework, they provide recommendations for future policies and practice in four key 
areas: i) Delivery of health services to inaccessible conflict-affected people; ii) Address 
chronic diseases in conflicts; iii) Improve health services for conflict-affected people in 
urban areas; and iv) Changes in surveillance, assessment, and monitoring or conflict-
affected populations. 
 
Such proposals are very much in line with current discussions within MSF on implementation 
of innovative strategies through the massive delivery of preventive packages and also with 
the recommendations of this evaluation on possible intervention strategies. 
 
5.3  Findings on intervention strategies 
To  assess  the  appropriateness  of  intervention  strategies,  the  evaluation  team  reviewed 
interventions in terms of MSF guidelines and standards (in particular the Top Ten Priorities in 
emergency situations), as well as the specific programme objectives. 
After revision of all case studies, the applied intervention strategies were categorised into 
four global approaches:  
i)   Emergency medical relief through MSF facilities (outreach, mobile or fixed), 
including measles vaccination, nutrition care and mental health.  
ii)    Engagement with existing health system (light support or facilitation of access to 
existing health facilities).  
iii)  Provision of non medical assistance (food, shelter, WatSan, NFI….).  
iv)  Advocacy for better assistance (UN, NGOs, governments) and protection (from 
violence and abuse and concerning legal status). 
 
The interventions reviewed are described in part II. The following chapter contains issues 
observed in regards to appropriateness of intervention strategies. The findings are structured 
as follows: i) Engagement with the existing health system; ii) Emergency medical relief; iii) 
Non-medical  assistance;  and  iv)  Others.  The  chapter  ends  with  other  examples  of  good 
practice in intervention strategies.  
 
5.3.1  Findings related to engagement with the existing health system 
Engagement with existing health system is a major challenge 
 Compared to camp situations, where setting up (temporary) parallel structures is a more 
common choice, there is a stronger tendency to engage with the existing healthcare system 
in open settings. In all the reviewed interventions, MSF chose to work through the existing 
healthcare system. Such engagement – at the minimum – may mean facilitation of access to 
existing services and – at the maximum – autonomous management of some health facilities 
/departments. The evaluators refer to ‘autonomous management’ when the activities are run 
by MSF staff and under full MSF supervision. ‘Light support’ implies supply of drugs and 
materials, with limited or irregular presence of MSF staff (mainly for training and supervision). 
The facilitation of access to existing health facilities implies assistance with administrative 
constraints or subsidising user fees. 
‘Light support’ was the choice of engagement in DRC, Cameroon and Djibouti. In DRC, MSF 
was reluctant to get involved again with the provision of health care in Dungu hospital as they 
had just withdrawn one year earlier after seven years of work in the same health facility. The 
problem of working with a system based on cost-sharing, without scope for removing fees 
where necessary, is a particular challenge in Djibouti.    36 
Djibouti is the only intervention reviewed where MSF set up its own healthcare facility: a 
therapeutic feeding centre (TFC). This can be justified as a temporary solution, given the 
high level of acute malnutrition which is not sufficiently addressed in Ministry of Health (MoH) 
structures.  
Cost  recovery  was  a  major  obstacle  for  MSF  in  Djibouti.  Even  though  exemption  from 
healthcare costs theoretically exists, illegal migrants and urban poor often don’t have the 
necessary papers to benefit from free of charge care. Generally, MSF is reluctant to pay for 
patients. However in this context there seems to be no alternative to paying, while lobbying 
for free care remains unsuccessful.  
In Dungu (DRC, Haut Uélé) MSF decided to take responsibility for the surgical activities, 
while providing only light support to the paediatric ward. The provision of free of charge care 
for  paediatrics  and  surgery  fulfilled  the  objective  to  overcome  the  financial  barrier  to 
healthcare.  However,  the  fact  that  MSF  supports  only  half  of  the  hospital  has  created 
confusion in the community and not many people (in particular not many IDPs) are aware 
that paediatrics and surgery healthcare is free of charge.  
The focus on surgery seemed arbitrary as the costs of care in the maternity and internal 
medicine wards were unaffordable to a large part of the population and the surgical activity 
was  dominated  by  elective  surgery,  with  only  a  small  proportion  of  conflict-related 
interventions.
19 While the support to surgery is not questioned as such, deployment of a full 
MSF surgical team seems disproportionate to the resources allocated to cover the needs in 
other services. It is also unclear on what arguments the decision to stop support to Dungu 
hospital was based, as the humanitarian situation has not changed and there is today an 
extra burden of 20,000 people. 
In Cameroon, MSF attempted to improve the quality of management of acute malnutrition 
with one MSF medical doctor deployed to support the MoH hospital doctor during the rounds 
twice  a  week  and to  discuss follow-up  of  MSF's  patient  transfers  to  the  hospital  (mainly 
refugees but also local people who came to the mobile clinics). However, collaboration with 
the  hospital  staff  was  difficult,  as  there  was  no  MSF  presence  on  a  daily  basis.  As  the 
mortality of patients with acute malnutrition was above the acceptable level, it is believed that 
more effort could have been made to negotiate MSF involvement in the management of 
malnutrition  at  the  hospital  level,  which  is  the  main  referral  structure  used  by  MSF's 
nutritional mobile clinics. 
Entry and exit criteria were not identified in any of the reviewed cases – except Pakistan – 
which further complicates the issue.  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good practice: Short term coverage of the extra burden put on the healthcare system  
In Pakistan, temporary support was provided with clear objectives. MSF set up an additional 
emergency unit in Mardan public hospital, receiving all the patients requiring intensive 
medical care. The public capacity of the public hospital could be significantly strengthened 
with these essential services during the displacement crises. The unit ran for four months 
until the displaced people returned home.  
In South Africa and Iraq, healthcare was ensured through referrals and facilitating access to 
existing health facilities. In both cases, advocacy was used successfully to guarantee free 
access to healthcare.  
 
 
 
                                                  
19 In Dungu hospital, out of 300 surgical interventions performed between June and September 2009, only 22 
( 7%) of interventions were related to violence.   37 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good Practice: Advocacy seen as an operational tool In South Africa 
The MSF strategy was to provide healthcare and at the same time demonstrate and 
advocate that the government can take charge. The use of existing activist networks was key 
in South Africa to obtain free access to health care for Zimbabwean refugees. 
In Iraq, MSF restricted its own role to thoroughly assessing the health needs and facilitating 
access to healthcare without much direct implementation of healthcare (except some mobile 
clinics providing mental health). This seems an appropriate choice in a context where health 
services exist.  
‘Light  support’  enables  primary  healthcare  facilities  to  cope  with  ‘excess’  patient 
burden 
 In Cameroon, MSF’s involvement in existing primary health facilities remained limited. Even 
though there were a series of quality concerns, it is suggested that after the emergency 
phase, more support to the existing health facilities (even if only through drug supply and 
training) could have been more effective than running a parallel system with mobile clinics. In 
DRC, the choice for primary healthcare facilities to be supported by MSF was appropriate in 
terms of the geography of the region (clinics were well situated in areas where there were 
large  concentrations  of people).  However  no  attention  was  paid  to  the fact  that  services 
provided there were neither accepted nor used by IDPs for various reasons.
20  
The observed practice of involvement in existing primary health facilities (Cameroon, DRC 
and  Pakistan),  mainly  through  drug  supply,  training  and  limited  supervision,  seems  an 
appropriate choice in order to allow uninterrupted functioning of existing services. It allows 
the existing system to cope with the excess burden of patients and the disruption caused by 
conflict and displacement.  
 
5.3.2  Findings related to emergency medical relief 
 Classical ‘emergency medical relief’ is rarely seen in reviewed interventions 
‘Medical relief’ refers to activities implemented in the emergency phase of a crisis, aiming at 
rapid decrease of morbidity and mortality rates. Such activities are based on the Top Ten 
Priorities and are often run in parallel with existing health systems.  
In projects reviewed, various medical and non medical relief activities were carried out during 
peaks of acuteness, such as direct provision of medical care through mobile clinics, mass 
measles vaccination, WATSAN activities, limited support to shelter and NFI distributions. The 
effectiveness  of  these  activities  are  impossible  to  evaluate  as  only  in  Cameroon,  the 
objectives  were  formulated  as  to  decrease  mortality  and  morbidity  rates  (due  to  acute 
malnutrition).  The  other  interventions  presented  the  objectives  only  in  terms  of  provision 
medical  and  non  medical  assistance  without  aiming  to  achieve  measurable  impact  on 
morbidity and mortality rates. This might be due to lack of reliable baseline data in most of 
the projects and absence of prospective surveillance system to measure the trends. 
Changing priorities of vaccination in open settings  
Measles vaccination was carried out in two out of the six reviewed projects (Cameroon and 
DRC). Unlike in camp settings, where measles vaccination is a first priority and needs to be 
implemented in the first few days, in both projects vaccination was carried out after several 
weeks. In four interventions, no vaccination was performed at all; there was no measles 
outbreak in any of these situations. Although sufficient vaccination coverage remains highly 
relevant, the different living conditions in (most) open settings suggest that mass measles 
                                                  
20 As stated repeatedly in interviews, Namboli health centre has a very bad reputation among the IDPs. The 
perception is that the people do not get better after a visit to the health centre.
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vaccination  may  no  longer  be  systematically  a  first  priority.  If  a  campaign  is  deemed 
necessary,  it  may  be  used  as  an  opportunity  for  implementing  a  more  comprehensive 
preventive healthcare package (other vaccines, bed net distribution, etc.) 
Nutrition programmes are well implemented, but defaulter rates are high  
The  decentralised  approach  to  nutrition  management  currently  in  use  allowed  easy 
implementation  of  nutrition  activities  in  all  concerned  projects.  Nutrition  was  a  strong 
component of the programmes and it provides an example of comprehensive management 
on all levels. Even in the complex context of DRC, nutrition is the best managed part of the 
programme.  What  remains  a  challenge  is  how  to  hand  over  MSF-designed  nutrition 
programmes when there is no national programme for nutrition.  
However, high defaulter rates remain a major problem, e.g. in Djibouti and Cameroon. In 
Cameroon, this was mainly due to long distances to treatment facilities and the nomadic 
lifestyle of the displaced population. In Djibouti, intra-urban mobility was a major challenge 
for follow–up care. So far, no strategies have been developed to deal with country-specific 
problems and bring down defaulter rates.  
Mental health support: willingness, but lack of capacity 
Despite an increasing awareness of mental health needs and a (rather) new MSF ‘reflex’ to 
implement  related  activities,  MSF  did  not  demonstrate  the  capacity  to  fully  assume  this 
activity in any of the evaluated programmes. 
In Dungu (DRC), mental health was a priority from the beginning of the programme, but a 
proper  set-up  of  psychological  care  failed  to  materialise  mainly  due  to  lack  of  specific 
capacities.  The  MSF  expatriate  psychologist  was  supposed  to  provide  supervision  and 
adequate response to more complicated cases. However, no psychologist was present for 
most of the project period. The volume of activity is rather small (three cases of rape per 
month and 20 cases of other type of violence per month). The collaboration with other actors, 
who provide psychological and medical support, is not very efficient. The added value of 
MSF provision of psychological care for victims of violence in Dungu town is questionable 
with other actors present and no medical care provided by MSF to sexual and gender based 
violence (SGBV) cases (usually a strong area of MSF care provision).  
In Iraq, attempts to establish a mental health programme were made, but activities could not 
be  supervised  and  progress  has  been  limited.  In  Pakistan,  OCP  planned  mental  health 
activities, but never found the resources necessary to implement them. 
Efficacy of mobile clinics depends on phase of emergency 
The use of mobile clinics was a common medical strategy in all reviewed projects except 
Djibouti, where mobile clinics were not accepted by the authorities. The specific objectives 
behind using mobile clinics varied between the interventions and between different phases of 
intervention. 
In  the  early  stages  of  an  intervention,  mobile  clinics  were  mainly  used  for  monitoring 
purposes (DRC, Cameroon, Pakistan), aiming at providing an overview of the humanitarian 
situation,  rather  than  at medical  impact.  In  later  stages,  more regular  but  geographically 
restricted,  semi-fixed  mobile  clinics  were  set  up.  In  addition  to  general  healthcare,  the 
additional  focus  was  on  management  of  acute  malnutrition  (Cameroon),  on  voluntary 
counselling and testing (South Africa) and on mental health (Iraq).  
In South Africa, the choice for a mobile strategy was based on the desire of migrants to stay 
invisible (hence locations and timing of mobile clinics was deliberately irregular). Later on, 
mobile  clinics  were  still  considered  necessary,  as  the  cost  of  frequent  travel  to  existing 
centres for voluntary counselling and testing was unaffordable for many patients.
21  
                                                  
21 It was assumed that once people who had tested positively were accepted into the public system, they 
would be able to afford occasional travel to the health clinic.    39 
In Cameroon, mobile clinics specifically dedicated to acute malnutrition were appropriate to 
decrease high mortality rates rapidly. However, once the target was achieved (after a few 
weeks), integration of the nutrition services into existing health facilities would have been 
more appropriate. 
In DRC, the choice of locations for regular mobile clinics seems logical considering the high 
concentration  of  IDPs  in  places  with  no  existing  health  facilities.  However,  security 
constraints led to irregularity and eventually closing of the mobile clinics. The overall impact 
of the mobile clinics was therefore limited. 
In  Iraq,  the  mobile  strategy  allowed  active  case  finding  and  follow-up  of  mental  health 
patients that would probably not seek assistance in the MoH Mental Health unit.  
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ Good practice: Gaining proximity to target population through mobile activities 
In Cameroon, a high level of interaction and proximity with the target population was reached 
through extensive (mobile) monitoring activities, a network of community health workers and 
frequent interviews with diverse refugee groups. Information collected provided a good 
overview of the humanitarian situation in the area, and was mainly used for lobbying 
purposes. The proximity to the displaced population was rewarding for the team and 
contributed to a high motivation throughout the intervention (which was highly demanding).  
Outreach worker invaluable, but set-up can be improved 
Despite its potential – especially in open settings – it is obvious that there is little attention 
given  to  outreach  programmes  compared  to  the  management  of  hospitals,  for  example. 
There also seems to be little awareness on proper set-up and a lack of knowledge about 
existing tools (e.g. OCA - Community Health Workers (CHW) guidelines).  
In Djibouti, recruitment of community nutritional assistants was a very appropriate strategy to 
create links with the community, however as the assistants were only selected from among 
the local population, while 50 per cent of the beneficiaries are foreigners, representation of 
the target population is poor.  
In DRC, MSF provides limited support to  30 MoH CHWs in Dungu  town (5  USD/month, 
training, supervision). As well as their usual MoH activities, the main objective of the CHWs 
set by MSF is to inform the community about MSF activities, provide health education and 
nutritional screening. The use of CHWs seems a very good strategy for this type of situation; 
nevertheless, several problems were identified in Dungu.  
It  seems  that  the  expectation  for  CHWs  to  carry  out  emergency  relief  was  clearly 
overambitious.  The  OCA-CHW  guidelines  makes  a  clear  distinction  between  emergency 
outreach  and  outreach  connected  to  basic  healthcare  programmes.  As  proposed  in  the 
outreach guidelines, outreach workers should be paid for emergency  work and managed 
separately from any existing system. Remuneration is considered best practice.  
 
Box 7: Problems observed with community health workers in DRC/Dungu 
·  Lack of motivation of CHWs due to limited financial support by MSF. 
·  CHWs from local population only (not displaced population).  
·  The same CHWs work for MoH/MEDAIR and Mercy Corps, and have limited time for MSF.  
·  Poor exchange between CHWs and MSF staff; No planning of CHWs activities.  
·  Limited number of referrals (people refuse referrals as they need to pay for care in the hospital).  
·  No supervision of CHWs in the community; only one supervisor for 30 CHWs. 
·  Supervision of activities without clear directives and objectives. 
·  CHWs not visible in the IDP community (none of the IDPs interviewed knew the CHWs). 
·  Health education not adapted to resources available, e.g. promotion of use of bed nets, but no bed 
nets. 
·  No prospective mortality follow-up.   40 
5.3.3  Findings on non-medical assistance  
Non-medical  assistance  was  marginal  in  reviewed  projects,  however  the  following 
observations could be made:  
Objectives for NFI distribution unclear 
For  most  of  the  projects  it  was  impossible  to  evaluate  the  appropriateness  of  strategies 
regarding  NFI,  as  neither  objectives  nor  targets  or  outputs  were  clearly  described  in  the 
proposal and project reports. As one MSF staff put it: ‘We do NFI or shelter if we don’t know 
what else to do.’  
The exception was Iraq, where distribution of NFI was the main strategy to reduce the impact 
of the cold winter. This was based on the needs identified during the initial assessment, 
however unfortunately implementation was delayed and therefore the impact was reduced.  
In  Cameroon,  Pakistan  and  DRC,  some  NFI  distributions  followed  needs  assessments. 
However,  the  criteria  for  these  distributions  were  not  clear  to  the  evaluators.  Cameroon 
provides a good example in the sense that MSF monitored the needs in the NFI sector and 
lobbied when important gaps were observed (this would have been relevant for DRC/Dungu 
as well).  
In DRC, the evaluators observed that IDPs left plastic sheeting as well as NFI kits (water 
containers, cooking sets, blankets, bed nets, etc.) to their host families when they relocated, 
so new needs emerged with changes in the IDP situation. However, the MSF team was 
unaware of such changes and did not respond.  
Minimum standards for water sanitation and shelter not applicable to open settings 
The  strategies  observed  did  not  follow  the  standards  outlines  by  the  Top  Ten  Priorities. 
However as many suggest, these standards are not applicable to open settings. Evaluators 
lack necessary expertise to elaborate further on this issue.  
Regarding  water  sanitation  (WatSan),  the  most  extensive  activities  were  carried  out  in 
Pakistan - external protection of some water sources, chlorine tablets/water purifier sachet 
distribution, construction of toilets/bathrooms for IDPs living in a newly constructed market, 
water trucking during acute shortages. These were appropriate actions considering the risk 
of cholera in an endemic area. 
Other  interventions  only  included  fragmented  activities:  in  Cameroon,  MSF  provided 
maintenance  of  boreholes,  construction  of  protected  wells  and  rehabilitation  of  water 
sources. In South Africa, MSF supported small shelters run by faith organisations through the 
provision of showers, toilets and setting up water distribution points.  
In Iraq, the assessment revealed problems related to shelter and proposed to assist IDPs 
with  roofing.  However  this  was  not  followed  up.  Apart  from  distributing  plastic  sheeting 
together with other NFIs, MSF did not get involved with shelter in any of the interventions.  
During the evaluators’ visits to DRC and Djibouti, acute problems related to shelters were 
observed in both locations. In Dungu, after the separation of IDPs from host families, some 
IDPs lived in extremely ‘sub-standard’ huts lacking protection from rain and vectors.  
Food: describing the situation and lobbying are a minimum requirement 
MSF’s policy states that describing a situation and lobbying are minimum requirements in 
any intervention.  
In Cameroon, this ambition was fulfilled, and in addition a temporary blanket food distribution 
was carried out by MSF. The main purpose was to cover the gap before the World Food 
Program (WFP) set up a general food distribution. Covering emergency needs appeared to 
be a good strategy and it appeared to increase MSF’s credibility for lobbying towards WFP to 
take responsibility for the food situation.   41 
5.3.4  Other findings 
Overambitious targets or under-response? 
In  Cameroon,  DRC  and  Djibouti,  initial  coverage  targets  were  not  reached  for  various 
reasons. No numbered targets were set in South Africa and Pakistan.  
In Cameroon, coverage of regular activities (nutrition mobile clinics) was quite limited (15% of 
target population); however the coverage of monitoring activities was considerably larger and 
the  majority  of  refugees  was  accessed  at  least  once  for  assessment  and  nutritional 
screening.  
In Djibouti, a nutritional survey conducted by MSF in July 2009 showed that only a small 
proportion of malnourished children were included in the nutritional programme.
22 The target 
– to assist a population of 10,000 refugees and 100,000 migrants – has not been met so far.  
 
In DRC, MSF provides assistance to one fifth of the target population of 100,000 IDPs in 
Dungu territory; the refugees receiving assistance are based in Dungu town.  
MSF  managed  to  survey  8,362  IDP  households  (44%)  of  an  estimated  19,033  IDP 
households  in  Dohuk  governorate  in  Iraq.  Forty  per  cent  of  the  3,320  IDP  households 
surveyed received NFI kits, indicating reasonable coverage of the beneficiary population.  
The underestimation of complexity in open settings leads to overambitious targeting. As a 
result OCG, in DRC/Haut Uele region, considered for too long they could cover the needs 
without the OCB emergency teams, who had offered to come and assist.  
Strategy adapted to the level of emergency 
Cameroon  is  one  example  where  the  initial  intervention  strategy  was  appropriate for the 
emergency phase. Specific mobile clinics for treating acute malnutrition resulted in reduced 
excess mortality and emergency objectives were rapidly achieved within a few weeks.  
Once mortality was reduced below emergency level (post-emergency), the mobile clinics lost 
their relevance. Here, the support to existing health facilities seems more appropriate than 
continuing to run a parallel (emergency) system, as happened for a total of 18 months (see 
Annex 9.) 
More complex objectives (management of Konzo
23, WatSan) were added in later stages of 
the intervention. It is not clear how these were linked to the initial reasons for intervention. 
Committing  to  this  longer  term  engagement  should  have  been  accompanied  by  a  re-
evaluation of needs, new targets and adaptation of the intervention strategy. 
At  the  start  of  the  interventions  in  DRC  the  level  of  emergency  was  basically  unknown, 
despite the clear findings of the initial assessment. Given the constantly changing needs and 
the magnitude of the crisis (in addition to the fact that MSF has previous experience in the 
region),  strategies  were  decided  upon  using  the  limited  opportunities  for  access  on  the 
assumption that the crisis would be short-lived.  
The  intervention  strategies  changed  many  times,  presenting  real  difficulties  in  finding  a 
workable way to overcome the problem of access. 
MSF  tried  to  go  everywhere  with mobile  clinics,  and  assess  the  area  at  the  same  time. 
Because of the inefficiency of such an approach it was decided to concentrate on a few 
places (well chosen locations for healthcare support and mobile clinics). This strategy would 
have been good if continuity could have been assured, but it had to be stopped due to the 
security situation.  
                                                  
22 13  out  of  101  (13%)  acutely  malnourished children  identified  during  the  survey  were  included  in  the 
nutritional programme.  
23  Epidemic  paralytic  condition  believed  to  be  linked  to  consumption  of  unsufficiently  processed  bitter 
cassava   42 
This example illustrates the dichotomy between the desire to provide quality care and the 
impossibility of doing so when needs are so widespread and access is compromised.  
 
Recruitment of health workers from host but not displaced population 
In Djibouti, as well as in DRC, MSF staff are from the host community only. This clearly limits 
MSF’s understanding of the displaced (needs, changes in the situation, power structures, 
information flow). The fact that members of displaced communities are not systematically 
recruited and included in assessments is a missed opportunity and lowers the acceptance of 
MSF by the displaced population.  
South Africa is a good example of migrants/refugees being actively recruited into the MSF 
team, which is of great benefit to the programme. In Cameroon, the team managed to get 
close to the displaced communities not least because of good interaction with CHWs coming 
from the refugee communities.   43 
5.3.5  Good practice examples on intervention strategies 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good practice: Accessing the invisible with innovation and flexibility 
Invisibility of migrants is a major challenge in South Africa and the OCB team has adapted 
their approach accordingly by: i) using small teams, who are less visible, and including 
people from Zimbabwe; ii) using a strategy adapted to the changes in legal status of 
refugees, i.e. moving the focus from formerly ‘invisible ’ to ‘newly arrived’ migrants; iii) 
identifying ‘areas of high migrant concentration’ (eg. church, bus stations, derelict buildings; 
and iv) adapting the MSF clinic opening hours to the needs of the people, such as evenings 
hours for those working during the day.  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good practice: Dealing with chronic diseases 
The prevalence of HIV and TB in Zimbabwe(and South Africa) is high. The challenge was 
how to design services for a highly mobile and partly invisible population. OCB made major 
efforts and used innovative approaches to reach those populations. Despite the complex 
challenges, the project achieved significant progress towards free access to healthcare.  
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good practice: Assuring access to healthcare for refugees and displaced 
Between 1990 and 1996, some 500,000 refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone arrived in 
the Forest region of Guinea (Van Damme, 1995). Most settled among the host population, 
<20% in refugee camps (Van Damme, 1999). The basic reaction of the Forest region’s health 
authorities after the influx of the refugees was to strengthen and expand the development of 
the network of health centres and health posts, and to set up a disease surveillance system. 
With the help of the refugee-assistance programme, the health system was well established 
within a year, assuring access to health care throughout the region for refugees and the local 
population alike (Van Damme et al, 1998). 
 
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿Good practice: Use of new technologies in refugee assistance 
UNHCR intervened for Iraqi refugees in three cities in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The 
strategies included: the establishment of efficient registration and reception systems; the 
introduction of effective community outreach and communication mechanisms (outreach 
volunteers, community centres); the use of new technologies (SMS, hotlines, TV) for 
communication with refugees and in the distribution of assistance; forming creative external 
relations and public information opportunities; and introducing and supporting health 
insurance schemes for refugees to help them to access services in a dignified manner. 
 
 
￿Good practice: Follow-up of displaced patients on ARV during political unrest 
During the political unrest in Kenya in 2008, innovative ways of patient follow-up – such as 
mobile phones and free telephone hotlines - were used. Patients throughout the country who 
had been displaced were able to call for guidance on how to get their medicines (MSF 
International, 2008). 
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5.4  The role of advocacy in operational strategies 
In the current review, three missions (South Africa, DRC and Cameroon) stand out for having 
integrated advocacy objectives in their operational strategies. In all cases, they achieved 
important  results  to  the  benefit  of  their  target  population.  Unfortunately  the  advocacy 
activities of the other interventions were less clear and/or less documented. Nevertheless the 
information that could be obtained is summarised briefly.  
In South Africa the project benefited from a long history of advocacy. The advocacy strategy 
was  completely  integrated  into  the  medical  action  early  on  because  the  legal  status  of 
Zimbabweans  was  a  key  problem,  in  particular  for  access  to  healthcare.  MSF  played  a 
crucial  role  in  getting  the  South  African  government  to  grant  migrants  free  access  to 
healthcare as stated in the Constitution. This was done through public positioning and social 
workers following up on individual cases. The South African government changed the visa 
regime for Zimbabweans so that they can now have legal status in the country and therefore 
have free access to healthcare. 
“The project would not make sense without advocacy. The South African government 
has the obligation and capacity to provide health care”. 
            Interview: Liesbeth Schockaert, 
AAU/OCB 
Box 8: Advocacy activities in South Africa  
· MSF published a press release to ask the South African government to stop the deportation of 
Zimbabweans (MSF, June 2008). 
· MSF also used networks of activists very effectively. It channelled local activism to push for free 
access  to  healthcare  by  sharing  information  with  legal  groups  which  then  mounted  a  legal 
challenge to the government.  
· In addition, by providing healthcare, MSF showed the South African government that it can take 
responsibility.  The  South  African  constitution  grants  everybody  free  access  to  healthcare, 
regardless of their legal status in the country. Yet, this was not properly enforced. MSF’s advocacy 
helped to make this a reality.  
· On witnessing serious abuses against unaccompanied minors, MSF set up a special counselling 
service and deployed strong advocacy towards the authorities and UNICEF to ensure minors had 
protection, shelter, healthcare, legal documents and other basic rights. 
· In June 2009, MSF published the report: No Refuge: Access Denied - Medical and Humanitarian 
Needs of Zimbabweans in South Africa. 
 
In  Cameroon,  advocacy  was  pursued  to  achieve  a  better  coverage  of  the  humanitarian 
needs of the refugees. Information was shared with other humanitarian groups and they were 
pressed to supply food and medical assistance to refugee populations. 
At the local level, coordination, advocacy and lobbying for better coverage of identified needs 
was the strong point of the intervention and it contributed to greater efforts by other actors 
present, such as WFP, CARE and UNHCR.  
At the international level, however, the advocacy efforts seem to have failed due to the lack 
of common messages and the reactions at different levels of influence at MSF headquarters. 
(Several interviewees said that their efforts in the field failed to receive proper support).    45 
Box 9: Advocacy activities in Cameroon (2007)  
 
·  Continuous lobbying at field and capital level at the very beginning of the project through 
regular meetings (the results of two surveys in East Province and Adamaoua were used for 
lobbying). 
·  Press  release  30.07.07  Geneva/Yaoundé :  “Situation  Nutritionnelle  Critique  pour  les 
Réfugiés Centrafricains”*  
·  Christian Captier’s meeting with the (previous) Minister of Health 02.08.07 
·  Press  conference,  Garoua  Boulaï  13.08.07  “Intervention  d’urgence  auprès  les  réfugiés 
Centrafricains.”*  
·  MSF also participated in the joint re-evaluation of humanitarian needs in collaboration with 
UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and FAO (August 2007). 
 
Achievements  
·  WFP started food distributions to the refugees and kept on doing so reasonably regularly 
(roughly every 5 weeks). 
·  UNHCR started carrying out registration rounds of refugees every six months. 
·  UNHCR started  paying for fees for refugees  in the  health facilities, (although not  always 
regularly). 
 
In DRC, one of the project’s objectives was to “document the situation of IDPs to develop a 
briefing  and  advocacy  paper  on  humanitarian  needs  (protection  issues)”.  Between 
September 2008 and March 2009, many testimonies were collected. This helped the field 
teams to have a better understanding of the context and the problems of extreme violence 
perpetrated by the LRA. The testimonies were also regularly posted on the MSF websites. 
This contributed to raising awareness and an increase in interest about the extent of the 
problem within the MSF Movement and the international community. For example, Human 
Rights Watch decided to investigate atrocities committed by LRA in the Haut-Uélé and Bas-
Uélé region. 
In February 2009, MSF made a public statement on the incapacity of MONUC to assure the 
protection of the civilian population despite its reinforced mandate on protection since the 
previous December. 
In June 2009, OCG published a briefing paper: “Trapped and Without Hope.” It reported that 
the people of northeast DRC were paying a high price in an interminable conflict. At the 
same  time,  the  DRC  health  ministry  held  a  briefing  at  the  UN  in  New  York  on  the 
humanitarian situation in the Uélé region and the lack of an efficient humanitarian response 
and the absence of protection. The MSF office in New York reported a positive response to 
this, however here is no information on the outcomes of these actions, although it is believed 
that MSF advocacy contributed to the mobilisation of other actors to the Uélé region.
24  
Unfortunately, the strong advocacy at the beginning of the intervention faded over time. The 
consultants’ visit to DRC flagged up a high level of needs among the displaced population 
and the impression during the visit was that MSF’s opinion was highly-regarded by the many 
actors present in the area. In the light of this, MSF should have been continuously flagging 
the IDP needs, and could be pushing other actors to provide more and better aid for the 
affected populations.  
In Djibouti and Iraq, no advocacy objectives were defined. However, the Djibouti mission 
lobbied  for  a  change  of  national  policy,  in  order  to  grant  systematic  treatment  for  acute 
malnutrition  free  of  charge.  As  a  result,  free  treatment  of  pathologies  associated  to 
malnutrition has been available since January 2010. In Pakistan, a series of press releases 
was issued on the plight of the displaced during the height of the crisis, but staff on the 
ground felt that MSF could have done more lobbying about the needs and the quality of care 
provided to the displaced.  
                                                  
24 Conversation with Marc Poncin, RT desk 3.
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5.5  Coordination 
Coordination is one of the Top 10 Priorities in a refugee situation, but it is 
probably also the most neglected or least implemented. Nevertheless, without 
proper coordination, any relief programme will rapidly become disastrous. 
                  (MSF, 1997) 
Coordination was not handled in any of the projects reviewed as an “integrated organisation 
of  relief  activities  under  an  accepted  leadership”  (MSF,  1997),  but  more  as  simple 
information-sharing among different actors, and, most often informally and at a bilateral level.  
In DRC, despite a strong presence of multiple actors, coordination is very poor. Actors meet 
regularly essentially to exchange information on security issues, but an overall understanding 
of the humanitarian needs and coverage of these needs by different actors remains weak. 
MSF does not feel it is in a position to take a more active role in the coordination process 
because of its own difficulty in understanding the situation and consequently to plan properly.  
It was observed that projects with a strong focus on advocacy and/or lobbying (Cameroon, 
South Africa) demonstrate better information-sharing and networking than others. However, 
this is mostly at the level of international actors. In urban areas such as in South Africa or 
Djibouti, it is evident that good networking and strong partnership are keys in identifying the 
most  vulnerable  and  in  getting  access  to  ‘invisible’  populations,  as  well  as  providing 
opportunities for referral to relevant health, social and legal services. Similar arguments have 
been made in existing literature (see Box 10 below).  
Interviewees emphasise the challenge that networking entails. It requires time to understand 
the environment and to create confidence with other organisations. For MSF, it is particularly 
important to  identify  trustworthy  organisations  to  be  able  to  refer  patients for  specialised 
medical services or for social, legal and protection services. 
Regarding internal or intersectional MSF coordination, the most obvious challenge appears 
in the contexts of insecurity. DRC and Pakistan are examples where MSF capacities could 
have  been  used  much  more  effectively  with  proper  coordination  rather  than  competition 
between  MSF  sections.  This  would  have  included  a  timely  definition  of  what  areas  one 
section can cover or not. In the current, complicated set up, centralised decision-making on 
security
25 in particular significantly hampers reactivity and timely implementation of activities.  
In addition to the complexity of the displacement in open settings, various elements have 
contributed to inefficient coordination in the projects reviewed: unclear role of UNHCR (DRC, 
Cameroon, South Africa), poor leadership of OCHA (DRC), the politicisation of aid (Pakistan) 
and an absence of adapted guidelines and policies for open settings including the standard 
indicators on health, shelter, WATSAN, food, etc.  
 
Box 10: Coordination in urban settings - references to literature 
Because of the urgency and scale of efforts, and the invisibility of vulnerable urban groups, response 
and  recovery  activities  in  urban  environments  are  difficult  to  manage.  An  effective  coordination 
mechanism can help to ensure that all relevant needs are considered across different sectors and 
diverse stakeholders interests. (ALNAP, 2009) 
Local  partnerships  –  or  at  least  fairly  elaborate  networking  with  local  authorities  and  other 
organisations (churches, NGOs, civil society groups, etc.) – are more commonplace in urban settings 
and  provide  ways of  avoiding  a  completely  substitutive  role.  Strong partnerships with  civil  society 
activist groups to further common advocacy objectives are key to the success and sustainability of 
these programmes. (Lucchi, 2009) 
In urban areas, it is local leaders, decision makers and interlocutors who take, and must 
continue to take, the lead in mobilising and coordinating humanitarian action and also in 
managing urban risk reduction (FMR, 2010). 
                                                  
25 New movements need to be validated at headquarters level.   47 
5.6  Discussion/ Conclusions 
Beyond top ten priorities 
Refugee Health, which has remained the key reference for MSF interventions for almost 20 
years, bases its logic on a linear progression from emergency to post-emergency phase in 
refugee  or  displaced  situations.  However,  as  argued  before,  in  open  settings  a  clear 
delineation between such two phases often does not exist, and periods of acute need may 
regularly occur during protracted crises. Consequently, short-term objectives based on the 
Top Ten Priorities, aiming only to cover the initial emergency phase of the crisis, do not seem 
always adapted to open settings.  
The  Top  Ten  Priorities  aims  at  reducing  high  mortality  during  the  emergency  phase  by 
targeting risk factors typical of camp-like settings.
26 However, the risks factors vary greatly in 
many  open  setting  situations.  OCB’s  additionally  defined  priorities  are  important, 
nevertheless even those only focus on the first three months of an emergency.  
It was observed that where the Top Ten Priorities are applicable (e.g. during the period of 
acute  need  in  Cameroon),  MSF  is  usually  clear  and  comfortable  about  its  role  as  an 
emergency actor, and what to do in a classical emergency is a natural reflex.  
On the other hand, MSF often seems paralysed in protracted situations, hesitating to take on 
‘atypical’ tasks. Teams commonly question the relevance of being present in the absence of 
visible and easily identifiable needs.  
Need for new intervention frameworks 
The diverse needs and challenges in the reviewed interventions were addressed with a wide 
range of sometimes innovative intervention strategies. On the one hand, this reflects the 
great flexibility of  MSF  and  provides important good  practice  examples  and evidence for 
development of new strategies. On the other hand, intervention strategies in the reviewed 
interventions were often decided on an ad hoc basic and changed frequently, partially due to 
uncertainty about the appropriateness of choices. This is well understood in the absence of 
evidence-based tools that could provide guidance on intervention choices in such complex 
settings. Moreover, unlike camps situations where timely assistance would in most cases be 
demonstrated by decreased mortality rates, the impact of most open setting interventions is 
difficult to measure.  
MSF clearly needs concepts for working in open settings. Elaboration of new intervention 
frameworks  for  complex  displacement  situations  is  desirable  to  provide  some  advice  on 
which strategies to opt for in which situations. Such frameworks, however, would need to 
take into consideration the various factors determining needs in open settings (see page 15): 
 
Two existing models could provide a base for further work on such frameworks: 
· Matrix of three types of settings (camp-like, urban, rural-dispersed) and two income 
and life-expectancies (low and medium to high) with corresponding challenges for 
future health policies and strategies (Spiegel et al; 2010); see table in Annex 8. 
· A range of situations that lie between ‘development’ and ‘disaster’ and complex links 
between pre-existing health services (primary healthcare (PHC)) and newly created 
emergency medical assistance (EMA).  
 
The first model is of particular interest for MSF as proposed interventions are in line with 
current internal discussions inside the MSF Movement.  
                                                  
26 Typical risk factors of camp-like settings: overcrowding, inadequate shelter, poor water, sanitation and 
hygiene conditions, lacking treatment facilities and insufficient nutrient intake.   48 
The second model is based on experience from Guinea, described in the chapter on good 
practices. Here, two opposing logics come into play: EMA, also called medical relief, and 
PHC. While PHC is seen as part of development, medical relief is linked with emergency 
situations. Van Damme argues that while PHC and EMA are clear opposite poles, many field 
situations  in  the  developing  world  are  today  somewhere  in-between.  In  such  ‘non-
development,  non–emergency’  situations,  an  adapted  intervention  strategy  will  have  to 
combine characteristics of both (Van Damme/ Van Lerberghe/ Boelaert, 2002). 
A joint effort (within MSF and with external actors) to develop such frameworks should be 
prioritised in order to share experiences and to build common knowledge on this complex 
issue. 
 
Some  operational  dilemmas  to  be  tackled  within  new  frameworks  and  guidelines  are 
presented below.  
Engagement with the existing health system: which criteria? 
Health system issues, previously not addressed in the context of parallel services in camps, 
are becoming of great importance in open settings. While defining its medical strategy in 
open  settings,  MSF  often  struggles  to  find  a  balance  between  highly  effective  parallel 
services and so called ‘light support’ to the existing health system. With high expectations on 
quality and accountability, MSF for a long time tried to avoid ‘dropping drugs’ without being 
able  to  control  the  outcomes.  Furthermore,  MSF’s  concern  has  been  to  not  disrupt  the 
existing healthcare system; but to find a balance between good quality care and minimal 
disturbance.  
In the reviewed interventions, drug dropping is common at health centre level and seems an 
appropriate temporary solution to assure the continuity of healthcare during periods of acute 
disturbance, while lobbying with development-oriented actors and donors for the longer term 
support.  
On the other hand, MSF remains reluctant to just drop drugs in hospitals and requires the 
presence of its teams to guarantee a quality of care. Nevertheless, this is done without the 
evaluation of the performance of the health structure and clear indicators about which quality 
of care should be achieved and how. Entry and exit criteria are also unclear when for this 
type of support.  
The evaluators argue that engagement on the hospital level must be made consciously in 
terms of the potential investment and the expected output. Such a decision requires clear 
objectives  on  what  is  to  be  achieved  and  it  also  demands  consideration  as  to  whether 
resources  could  be  used  more  efficiently  with  alternative  strategies.  Set  up  of 
benchmarks/minimum criteria for quality of care (e.g. mortality in paediatric ward less than 5 
%)  might  be  helpful  to  define  clear  objectives  and  to  decide  on  the  level  of  investment 
needed (light support versus more heavy investment). 
Increasing access – rethinking set-ups 
Providing high quality results in selected hospitals or health centres in open settings has led 
to frustrating results in terms of very low coverage of people most in need. In the absence of 
an  effective  referral  system, few  reach  the  supported  services  either  as  a  result  of  poor 
access or by choice.  
In open settings, it is arduous to duplicate the ‘four-level health care model’ developed for 
camp settings (MSF, 1997) including well-established referral links, simply because of the 
immense resources needed. In the absence of a functioning referral system, few patients 
effectively have access to the services. 
The widespread needs in open settings clearly must be addressed with innovative strategies 
aiming  at better  coverage, and looking at more  community-based approaches. Only  with 
strong  involvement  of  the  affected  communities  can  activities  be  continued  even  where   49 
(external) staff presence is restricted. In a situation with only intermittent access, such as 
DRC,  it is  proposed to shift tasks to community-based outreach workers to provide both 
preventive and simple curative activities in order to prevent excess mortality. The latter can 
also be used for basic surveillance and should raise the alarm in case of an unusual event 
(epidemic, acute conflict, etc.) 
MSF is currently piloting such approach, by systematically addressing different preventive 
options. These interventions can be implemented over a short period, i.e. using (security 
related)  windows  of  opportunity,  particularly  in  remote  areas.  They  include  vaccines 
preventing respiratory tract infections and diarrhoeal diseases, point-of-use water treatment, 
prevention of malaria and targeted food supplements.  
MSFs recent experience in nutritional care demonstrates that it is possible to shift from a 
complicated  and  centralised  approach  to  a  more  flexible  and  community-focused  set-up. 
MSF may try to develop similar models in other areas of intervention such as mental health 
treatment, care for sexual violence etc.  
Response to the need for surgical capacities – but how? 
MSF  faces  a  dilemma  in  unstable  areas  and  prolonged  crises  where  repetitive,  but 
unpredictable  waves  of  armed  conflict  cause  war  injuries  and  consequently  a  need  for 
surgical intervention. As the care for victims of conflict remains an operational priority for 
OCG, this is an ongoing challenge. 
Today, OCG is trying to reinforce surgical capacities in existing hospitals with very small 
output.
27 This might be partially explained by several factors: a) most risks in recent conflicts 
are due to its indirect consequences (such as infectious and non infectious diseases) and not 
to conflict related trauma; b) referral capacities are limited due to geographical spread and 
insecurity;  c)  services  are  often  set  up  in  small  secondary  health  facilities  with  small 
catchment areas. 
In order to improve outputs, the strategic option could be to run a central secondary heath 
level structure with surgical capacity in contexts prone to repeated conflicts (e.g. in Bunia for 
DRC, etc.)
28 This would allow to care for victims of conflict and other severe cases across a 
large geographical area. However, considerable means for referral should be put in place 
(e.g. MSF aeroplane in DRC). 
Alternatively, the choice of OCP in Pakistan to set up a temporary emergency unit in the 
public hospital provides an option to consider where circumstances allow.  
Tackle chronic diseases  
It  has  been  well  described  elsewhere  how  the  burden  of  disease  is  changing  in  conflict 
affected countries due to various factors (Spiegel et al., 2010). Even though the management 
of chronic diseases (especially HIV and TB) has much improved within MSF projects during 
the last decade, it is still rare that these conditions are tackled during displacement crises. 
For  the  reviewed  projects,  South  Africa  was  the  notable  exception  (providing  the 
management of HIV and TB to displaced populations). Non infectious chronic diseases such 
as hypertension or diabetes were not addressed.  
Clearly, the continuity of treatment of infectious chronic diseases should be the priority in 
every setting in order to prevent drug resistance to current treatment. 
Unfortunately this issue  could  not  be  addressed  in  detail in this  evaluation,  but it seems 
evident that MSF will be required to tackle this problem.  
                                                  
27 In Dungu hospital, out of 300 surgical interventions performed between June and September 2009, only 
22 ( 7%) of interventions were related to violence.  
28 The ICRC has demonstrated this option with many pros (reliable, good quality care) and cons (problem of 
transport, postoperative care) over many years in South Sudan and Pakistan.   50 
Role of advocacy  
Given the proximity to the communities it works with, MSF can advocate for change as well 
as provide accounts of how people are suffering. Advocacy objectives can vary and may 
include:  
·  Introducing new protocols for care. 
·  Provision of health services in neglected areas.  
·  Access to existing health care. 
·  Exemption from user fees for particular or general health services. 
·  More and better aid to be provided by international donors and organizations in a 
particular setting.  
 
Bearing  witness  and  public  communication  on  the  suffering  of  populations  affected  by 
violence  is  equally  important  (Lucchi,  2009).  Operational  strategies  would  greatly  benefit 
from an integrated advocacy approach.    51 
6  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1  Recommendations on assessment 
 
⇒  Explore innovative assessment approaches for areas with intermittent access 
o  Consider  ‘distance  assessment’,  i.e.  bring  selected  representatives  of  both 
communities  (host  and  displaced)  to  location  accessible  for  the  MSF  team  in 
order to carry out ‘assessment workshop’
29  
o  Include small pockets of displaced as these locations might present particular 
vulnerabilities 
o  Based  on  secondary  sources,  elaborate  and  regularly  update  community 
mapping of affected area, informing on population demography, essential needs, 
vulnerable groups, etc. 
o  Use  security  related  windows  of  opportunity  for  rapid  response  based  on 
secondary information and for updating assessment findings 
 
⇒  Actively consult and involve displaced and host communities  
o  Look  at  population’s  perceived  needs,  priorities,  health  seeking  behaviour, 
vulnerabilities and capacities 
o  Consult and assess the capacity and the  willingness of local authorities to 
provide for the needs of the affected population 
 
⇒  Use existing information more effectively  
o  Use sources from authorities, NGOs, UN; limit the number of assessments 
and avoid assessment fatigue 
 
⇒  Adopt concept of continual assessment  
o  Monitor trends through community surveillance, running activities and regular 
consultation with the community and rapidly assess the new displacement sites 
 
⇒  Decide on one tool(box) to be used for assessments in OCG 
o  Possibly adopt OCA Manual for the Assessment of Health and Humanitarian 
Emergencies as a reference tool for assessments in open settings 
 
⇒  Provide better guidance on assessments 
o   At  HQ  level  one  person  must  be  in  charge  of  assessment  in  complex 
emergencies/open  settings  and  provide  technical  guidance.  S/he  should  be 
involved in planning, design and check validity of findings and data analysis. S/he 
                                                  
29  The  objective  would  be  to  get  relevant  information  in  order  to  identify  priority  locations  for  further 
assessment/intervention. Vulnerability mapping should also be done. During distance assessment, selected 
participants  could  be  trained  on  specific  data  collection  (food  security,  MUAC  screening,  mortality,  main 
morbidities, etc.) in order to obtain more detailed information from each area.   52 
should  coach assessment teams  on the  use of different methods  and  provide 
them with appropriate tools and checklists.  
o  An  assessment  coordinator  might  be  useful  in  contexts  where  many 
assessments are expected over a longer period of time (e.g. DRC, Cameroon). 
S/he  should  provide  technical  expertise  for  assessment  design,  appropriate 
methodology and tools depending on the context and objectives defined by the 
field coordinator or head of mission. S/he should also be responsible for training 
and supervision of national staff involved in assessments and/or surveys.  
 
⇒  Build assessment capacities  
o  Organise  training  on  assessment  methods  and  skills  for  national  and 
international staff 
o  Promote the role of national staff in assessment 
 
⇒  Facilitate  the  participation  of  specific  experts  when  needed  (anthropologist, 
lawyer, psychologist, epidemiologist, etc.) 
 
⇒  Promote the use of qualitative methodologies  
o  Use MSF-UK guide on qualitative methods as practical guide. 
o  Establish  a  training  module  on  the  use  of  qualitative  methods  (either 
integrated in existing courses: psychosocial support, field coordinator training) or 
possible new training on assessment, evaluation and monitoring 
 
⇒  Rethink the role of RHA and surveys for assessment in open settings  
o  Revise objectives, timing, methodology, expertise needed. 
o  Participate in operational research on alternative ways of measuring mortality 
and explore new methods of population estimations 
 
⇒  Develop a frame to assess risks, vulnerability and capacity to cope  
o  Build on external experience of IFRC and IDMC to be used in assessment.  
 
⇒  Provide  guidance  on  assessing  main  barriers  to  access  to  health,  including 
health seeking behaviour and performance of health facilities  
o  Define criteria to benchmark the quality of healthcare 
 
⇒  Consult  external  expertise  available  to  revise  currently  used  indicators 
(mortality,  shelter,  NFI,  WatSan,  etc.)  to  benchmark  the  severity  and  monitor  the 
emergency in complex/open settings 
o  Use of alternative indicators such as food security, access to health care and 
other basic needs and when classical indicators, such as mortality rates are 
unpractical   53 
6.2  Recommendations on intervention strategies 
 
⇒  Develop new intervention frameworks for complex emergencies/open settings 
with  strategies  adapted  to  specific  contexts  (displacement  setting,  country’s  income, 
onset of crisis, character of emergency, duration, humanitarian space) based on: 
o  Two  models  presented  in  this  report  (Annex  8  and  9)  and  best  practices 
observed.  
o  Consultations of external actors incl. international agencies and academics. 
 
Some considerations for future frameworks: 
o  Distinguish  between  situations  requiring  immediate  relief  intervention 
(ex.  Pakistan),  and  those  requiring  medium-term  preventive  interventions 
(ex.  South  Africa),  taking  into  considerations  that  in  most  situations,  the 
combination of both will be required (Cameroon, DRC, Iraq, Djibouti, South Africa) 
o  Ensure  that  the  medical  strategy  addresses  exiting  gap  accordingly  to 
evaluated  health  status,  capacity  and  performance  of  existing  health  system, 
barriers to access and it is adapted to local health seeking behaviour 
o  Keep a balance between medical relief and continuity of existing health 
system, with varying strategies according to the level of emergency  
o  Define entry / exit criteria and objectives for engagement at hospital level 
o  Assess  excess  burden  on  the  hospital  related  to  displacement  and 
capacity to cope. 
o  Conduct quick assessment of the quality of care and identify main gaps.  
o  Set  up  benchmarks/minimum  criteria  for  expected  quality  of  care  (e.g. 
mortality in paediatric ward less than five per cent). 
o  If minimum criteria of health facility performance are acceptable: Provide 
minimal  support  (drugs,  material,  incentives,  few  extra  resources), 
Guarantee free access to healthcare (ensure ways to verify), Avoid whole 
MSF team getting involved in hospital management. 
o  If minimum criteria of health facility performance are not reached, MSF 
might decide to invest more heavily, if objectives are clear.  
o  Define context specific criteria and scope for so called ‘light support’ or 
facilitation of access 
o  Based on the analysis of health status of affected population, main health 
threats, access to health care and performance of exiting health system   
o  Define  non-medical  assistance  considering  population  vulnerabilities, 
capacity and coping mechanisms 
 
⇒  Develop community based strategies 
o  Focus on prevention, early diagnosis and treatment of the main killers. 
o  Prioritise outreach workers and allocate resources accordingly.  
o  Develop  the  tool  kit  and  the  training  program (based  on  OCG  example  in 
Myanmar) for rapid set up of CHW’s network  
o  Pilot mass delivery of preventive packages.    54 
⇒  Address  chronic  diseases,  at  a  minimum,  assure  continuity  of  TB  and  HIV 
treatment  
 
⇒  Use advocacy and lobbying as an operational tool for better coverage of needs 
and protection issues  
 
⇒  Recruit  health  staff  from  affected  populations  (considering  all  sub-groups  of 
displaced and host populations) 
 
⇒  Carry out operational research to demonstrate outcomes of different/innovative 
intervention strategies 
 
 
6.3  Context specific considerations 
 
Evaluators were requested to draw up recommendations for different types of displacement 
settings.  This  was  a  difficult  exercise,  however  specific  considerations  related  to  the  six 
different settings are described below. These are partly based on good practice examples, 
and partly on the analysis of the reviewed interventions.  
 
1)  Iraq case study 
Characteristics  of 
the crisis:  
 
Displacement  in  several  waves,  intermittent  character,  rural  and  urban 
setting,: middle income country, well functioning health structures  
Main  risk  factors:  impact  of  cold  winter  season  (bad  living  conditions), 
psychological trauma, financial barrier of access to secondary and tertiary 
health care  
Target population: 
 
Target the most vulnerable: 
-  Recent IDPs 
-  Geographical targeting (poorer IDPs living in rural areas) 
-  Households with high number of females 
-  Female headed households 
 
 
Intervention 
strategy 
 
⇒  distribution of NFI for winter season  
⇒  Mental health through mobile clinics linked with existing system for 
severe cases 
⇒  Facilitation of access to healthcare (subsidize user fees) for urgent 
cases 
Specific 
considerations 
⇒  Using new technologies (SMS) to organise the distributions 
⇒   
Challenges  ⇒  Criteria for facilitation of access (who should benefit?) 
⇒  Identify the target population for NFI distribution 
⇒  Timeliness of NFI distribution  
⇒  Link between MSF mobile clinics (psychological support) and existing 
structures 
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2)  DRC case study 
Characteristics 
of the crisis:  
 
Acute  onset,  protracted  character,  periods  of  acute  peaks  of  violence, 
rural/dispersed setting, low income country, displaced as vulnerable as host, 
collapsed health system, impended access (security, geography)  
Target 
population: 
 
All affected area; both displaced and host population 
General 
considerations:  
 
 
⇒  Target the main killers such as malaria, pneumonia, acute 
malnutrition and neonatal disorders 
⇒  Simplify approach in order to increase coverage 
⇒  Use security related windows of access for targeted assistance 
(distance assessment using secondary information and remote sensing) 
⇒  Shift tasks to outreach workers (ORW) for basic prevention and 
curative activities 
⇒  Continually assess to spot changes and adapt interventions 
accordingly  
-  Distance assessment for inaccessible areas, MSF rapid 
response team to evaluate new displacement sites, simplified 
surveillance through ORW network and existing health structures, 
situation monitoring via mobile clinics  
 
Peaks  of  acute 
violence  
⇒  Directly provide medical relief through: 
-  Implementation of curative and preventive packages at 
community level through mass campaigns during security related 
windows 
-  Temporary mobile clinics for provision of basic medical care, 
emergency psychological assistance, management of acute 
malnutrition and SGBV  
-  Provide the means for referrals of severe cases  
⇒  Assure the continuity and free access in exiting health structures 
(drugs, material, incentives) 
⇒  MSF run central referral structure for management of severe cases 
⇒  Non medical assistance through: 
o  Temporary provision of food, NFI, shelter 
o  Home based water treatment as part of preventive packages 
 
“Chronic” period  ⇒  Light support to existing health structures (drugs, material, incentives, 
trainings, supervision) 
⇒  Provision of basic preventive and curative services through 
community networks in remote areas 
⇒  Assure continuity of treatment of chronic diseases treatment (HIV, TB) 
⇒  Lobbying for better coverage of non-medical needs 
⇒  Targeted NFI distribution according to vulnerability assessment 
Challenges:  ￿  Identify and count population, quantify the needs, measure 
and interpret mortality data 
￿  Specific indicators and criteria for shelter, water, NFI 
￿  Entry and exit criteria for the engagement at hospital level 
￿  Simplified assessment of health system performance  
￿  Increase coverage in situations with intermittent access  
￿  Means for referrals (MSF aeroplane, helicopter, etc.) 
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3)  Cameroon case study 
Characteristics 
of the crisis:  
 
Slow  onset,  protracted  character,  intervention  during  acute  periods, 
rural/dispersed setting, low income country, poorly functioning health system, 
free access for refugees  
Target 
population: 
 
Geographical targeting according to degree of need 
Assist both displaced and host population 
Specific 
considerations:  
 
 
⇒  Specialized mobile clinics appropriate for acute phase (acute 
malnutrition) 
⇒  Integration of activities into existing health facilities (support for drugs 
and training) after emergency phase 
⇒  Re-evaluation of situation after emergency phase with re-orientation of 
the programme 
⇒  Mid-term strategy to address chronic diseases (TB, HIV) 
⇒  More intensive engagement with hospitals (e.g. prevention of high 
mortality of hospitalized patients due to acute malnutrition)  
 
 
4)  Djibouti case study 
Characteristics 
of the crisis:  
 
Slow  onset,  protracted  character,  chronic  crisis  with  temporary  emergency 
situation  due  to  acute  problem  of  malnutrition,  urban  setting,  low  income 
country,  poorly  functioning  health  system,  cost  recovery,  restriction  from 
authorities to target migrants  
Target 
population: 
 
Geographical targeting of poor neighbourhoods (displaced and host) 
Specific 
considerations:  
 
 
⇒  Substitution appropriate as temporary solution for TFC (negotiation of 
hand-over in advance is a good practice)  
⇒  Better briefed/trained expatriate staff (proximity) 
⇒  ORW network for follow-up  
⇒  Reduce financial barriers to access (e.g. pay for referrals) 
⇒  Address chronic diseases (TB) 
 
 
5)  Pakistan case study 
Characteristics 
of the crisis:  
 
Rapid onset, short and acute character, rural setting, middle income country 
well functioning health structures, but over helmed by the crisis 
Main risk factors: cholera epidemic, access to health care  
Target 
population: 
 
Targeting of most  vulnerable  based on economic criteria,  identified by  local 
teams  
Specific 
considerations:  
 
⇒  Low profile intervention through well-established local networks 
⇒  Cholera EPP 
⇒  Facilitation of access to healthcare (e.g. free of charge consultation 
within existing healthcare system) 
⇒  Short term support to existing hospitals (emergency unit)   57 
 
6)  South Africa case study 
Characteristics 
of the crisis:  
 
Progressive  onset,  protracted  crisis,  mixed  displacement  setting  urban  and 
rural, high income country, functioning health system  
Main  risk  factors:  access  to  secondary  health  care,  high  burden  of  chronic 
diseases (HIV, TB), xenophobic violence 
Target 
population: 
 
Illegal migrants in typical working places (farms in rural areas) and gathering 
places in urban areas 
Intervention 
strategy:  
 
 
⇒  Active facilitation of access to hospitals for migrants (referral letter, 
accompaniment by MSF social assistant, subsidized fees for urgent 
treatments ) 
⇒  Dealing with chronic diseases (TB, HIV) 
⇒  Address problem of violence (SGBV management) 
⇒  Targeted NFI distribution and support to shelter  
⇒  Advocacy as a operational tool for change (legal status of migrants) and 
fully integrated into intervention strategy 
Specific 
considerations 
⇒  Intervention through small, less visible teams 
⇒  Flexible approach through mobile clinics so as not to expose migrants 
(adapted opening hours, changing locations, etc.) 
⇒  Networking with civil society (e.g. legal groups for litigation, activists, 
etc.) for better identification and assistance of migrants 
Challenges  ⇒  Reach the most vulnerable 
⇒  Respond to urban violence 
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8  ANNEXES 
 
Annex 1: Terms of Reference 
 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TRANSVERSAL EVALUATION ON  
MSF’S RESPONSE TO DISPLACEMENTS IN OPEN SETTINGS 
 
 
Subject:............................Transversal evaluation on displacement in open settings 
Starting Date:..................October 2009 
Length of the Mission:...12-16 weeks 
Responsible:...................Vienna Evaluation Unit 
Ownership:......................The Evaluation was commissioned by Bruno Jochum, Operational director 
of OCG;  
ToR elaborated by: ........Bruno Jochum, Mzia Turashvili, Sabine Kampmüller 
 
CONTEXT 
 
MSF  faces  increasing  challenges  in  its  response  to  displaced  populations.  The  classical 
camp  situations  (with  few  exceptions  such  as  Chad)  are  almost  non-existent  and 
displacement happens in open settings in both rural and urban areas. Besides, refugees 
fleeing  conflict  are  decreasingly  given  legal  recognition  and  are  therefore  forced  into 
clandestine migration, seeking ‘invisibility’ inside big urban centres.  
MSF,  as  a  mainly  emergency  focused  organisation,  has  over  the  years  developed  and 
adapted tools for assessment of the health status of displaced populations but all those are 
basically suitable for closed settings, such as IDP or refugee camps. The same is true for 
implementation strategies, which are adapted to closed settings, but seem less appropriate 
for open settings. The old, well established tools of assessment are not effective in detecting 
the specific vulnerability of displaced groups, or even marginalized sub-groups within the 
displaced  population;  today,  they  represent  only  a  small  fraction  (10-15%)  of  the  total 
displaced  populations.  We  currently  have  few  means  and  insufficient  capitalization  of 
experience  to  assess  properly  the  vulnerability  and  needs  of  displaced  people  in  open 
settings.  The  design  of  relevant  programmes,  which  may  imply  ‘discrimination’  through 
precise targeting of beneficiaries, raises many questions.  
Some  countries,  such  as  Somalia  and  Cameroon,  provide  good  examples  of  displaced 
populations in open settings. In Cameroon, the fact that there are 70-80 dispersed sites with 
pockets of around 100 people makes access to them very difficult and minimizes the impact 
of the interventions. In many other settings, the displaced population is mixed with the local 
resident populations and identifying the most vulnerable is a tremendous challenge (current 
examples of Djibouti, DRC or Pakistan, experience of Iran with Afghan refugees). 
States today frequently do not follow the conventions on refugees. Refugee populations have 
a choice between being illegal migrants or illegal refugees. While states are in favour of such 
displacement patterns that avoid camp settings and can  lead  to better  social integration, 
major  questions  arise  for  MSF  on  how  to  practically  organise  meaningful  humanitarian 
assistance and whether some situations require advocacy for legal recognition and better 
policies.    62 
This  challenge  of  changing  displacement  patterns  is  to  be  explored  for  MSF  to  identify 
appropriate response strategies.   
 
OVERALL OBJECTIVE AND PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The evaluation will fulfil the following objectives by reviewing available external competence, 
experience and recommended ‘best practices’ as well as recent MSF interventions:  
￿  Assess the appropriateness of assessment techniques and tools currently used by 
MSF, in order to improve them for future interventions. 
￿  Analyse the appropriateness of intervention strategies by reviewing relevance and 
effectiveness of MSF interventions.  
 
The purpose of the evaluation is to assess current challenges and shortcomings in needs 
assessment and response to displacement in open settings, in order to adopt techniques and 
recommend strategies accordingly. The outcomes will feed into an ongoing working group in 
OCG on displacement in open settings and provide a basis for a future training module for 
coordinators.  
 
 
KEY QUESTIONS 
 
1.  What  are  the  ‘best  practices’  (for  needs  analysis  and  intervention  strategies) 
recommended  by  external  actors  with  operational  experience  or  knowledge  of  these 
situations?
30  
2.  How does MSF approach the specificities of the different patterns of displacement in 
open settings?
31 
a.  Dispersion in small pockets across a large geographical area (Cameroon). 
b.  Hosting by resident populations (DRC (Haut Uélé), Pakistan). 
c.  Invisibility due to IDPs being scattered throughout big urban centres (Djibouti). 
3.  How appropriate were the assessments conducted in recent interventions? 
a.   How were assessments carried out? How did existing techniques apply in 
practice  (in  this  context)?  What  are  the  new  demands  on  assessment 
techniques/tools/methods?  (Appropriateness  of  techniques  –  compared  to 
existing tools/guides) 
b.  What  was  the  outcome  of  assessments?  What  type  of  information  was 
obtained? (Quality of information obtained) 
c.  How  were  marginalised  sub-groups  and  their  particular  vulnerabilities 
identified and considered in the assessments?  
4.  How  appropriate  are/were  the  different  intervention  strategies  applied  to 
displacements today (compare different settings) to address the prevailing needs? 
a.  How was the information collected used to define objectives and strategies? 
(Relevance of objectives) 
b.  What were the overall outputs and outcomes in terms of activities, coverage 
(of  the  specific  target  population)  and  timeliness?  (Effectiveness  of  current 
strategies) 
                                                  
30 A description of ‘best practices’ is expected to provide a baseline against which the current MSF practice 
can be compared.  
31  A  description  of  different  patterns  of  displacement  in  open  settings  and  their  specific  challenges  is 
expected in order to consider the differences when addressing the subsequent evaluation questions.   63 
EXPECTED OUTCOMES OF THE EVALUATION 
 
·  Final  report  of  max.  40  pages,  including  an  executive  summary  and  table  of 
recommendations.  
·  Intermediate presentations to the main stakeholders of the evaluation.  
·  Final presentation and discussion of findings.  
 
PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EVALUATION 
 
The evaluation will focus on a variety of settings: rural and urban areas, areas where small 
groups  of  IDPs  have  gathered  temporarily  or  IDP  populations  interspersed  with  resident 
populations.  
 
For OCG, recent projects include: 
-  Iraqis displaced in Kurdistan (winter 2007/2008)  
-  CAR refugees in Eastern Cameroon (closed 2009) – displacement in small 
pockets 
-  DRC (Haut Uélé) and Irumu (opened 2008) – hosting by resident population 
-  Djibouti slums (opened 2009) – illegal arrivals, IDP populations interspersed 
with resident populations in urban centre 
 
The  evaluation  will  also  include  OCB  projects  in  Pakistan  (2009)  and  South  Africa 
(Zimbabwean refugees) due to the specific challenges experienced in these settings.  
 
The Vienna Evaluation unit will guide and supervise the evaluation process.  
 
METHODOLOGY PROPOSED 
 
·  Internal and external literature review.  
·  Interviews and focus group discussions with MSF staff.  
·  Interviews with other emergency / international organisations. 
·  Desk study of assessment data, project documents, output/outcome data.  
·  Visiting selected projects for case studies, including interviews with displaced 
people.  
 
EVALUATION TEAM 
 
The  evaluation  team  is  composed  of  three  people  with  complementary  backgrounds 
including medical, operational and research experience. The process will be supported by a 
consultant from the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.  
   64 
Annex 2: List of Interviews 
 
Interviews were conducted between November 2009 and January 2010 
 
OCG: 
Bouriachi, Oifa: deputy programme manager, E-
desk 
Broillet, France: Innovative preventive strategies  
Ciglenecki, Iza: medical advisor, epidemiology 
Cristofani, Susanna: medical referent,  
Humphris, Phillip: programme manager,  
Kuge, Matthias: medical advisor, anaesthetist 
Lelevrier, Yann: logistics officer,  
Matte, Jean-Seb: programme manager,  
Mekaoui,  Helmi:  deputy  programme  manager, 
E-desk 
Poncin, Marc: programme manager, 
Queyras,  Guillaume:  operational  logistics 
manager 
Quere, Michel: medical referent,  
Reaiche, Souheil: deputy programme manager,  
Rull, Monica: deputy programme manager,  
Rusch, Barbara: medical advisor, nutrition 
Souza,  Renato  De:  medical  advisor,  mental 
health 
Urbaniak, Veronique: medical referent,  
Wolmark, Laure: project officer-violence 
 
OCB: 
Bauernfeind, Ariane: programme manager 
De le Vingne, Brice: programme manager 
Oberreit, Jerome: director of operations 
Schockaert,  Liesbeth:  Advocacy  and  Analysis 
Unit 
 
 
 
Interviews were conducted with 
representatives of institutions and 
organizations in the following 
countries/locations: 
 
Johannesburg: 
MSF  (head  of  mission,  medical  coordinator, 
logistics  coordinator,  field  coordinator,  medical 
responsible,  medical  doctor,  outreach  team, 
clinic responsible) 
 
Pakistan:  
MSF (former head of mission, MSF Pakistan) 
 
Cameroon:  
MSF (MSF field nurse) 
 
DRC:  
CARITAS,  Comboni  Brother,  Namboli, 
Conscience,  local  NGO,  COOPI,  ICRC,  local 
leaders  and  beneficiaries,  MSF  (emergency 
logistics  coordinator,  head  of  emergency 
mission,  head  of  mission,  field  coordinator), 
MEDAIR,  deputy  administrator  of  Dungu 
territory,  mental  health  counsellor),  OCHA, 
Solidarites, UNHCR, WFP 
 
Djibouti:  
AMDA, beneficiaries, CARITAS, Catholic church 
(Bishop),  FHI  (Family  Health  International), 
ICRC,  Imams,  International  Organization  for 
Migration (IOM), Malteser, nutritional assistants, 
Protestant church, UNHCR, WFP 
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Annex 4: Appraisal of Available Guides and Tools for their Use in Open Settings 
 
 
Rapid Health 
Assessment 
(RHA) of 
Displaced 
Populations  
Refugee Health 
Priority 
Indicators  
+ Assessment 
Grids (OCG) 
Manual for the 
Assessment of 
Health and 
Humanitarian 
Emergencies 
Guide to Using 
Qualitative 
Methods 
Description of 
the manual 
Practical 
guidelines on 
how to perform 
RHA 
Overview of 
information 
required and 
methods used in 
initial 
assessment 
Checklists for 
data collection 
during initial 
assessment 
(based on Top 
Ten Priorities)  
Comprehensive 
manual on 
assessment in 
emergency 
situations, 
including 
checklists 
Comprehensive 
guide on use of 
qualitative methods 
including practical 
explanations of 
their use, 
application and 
data analysis 
Methods 
presented 
Quantitative 
(sample survey, 
mapping, etc.) 
Quantitative and 
qualitative 
(survey, 
systematic 
observation, 
interviews, focus 
group 
discussions) 
No methods 
described 
Quantitative and 
qualitative   Qualitative  
Explanation of 
the methods  YES  Partially  NO  YES  YES 
Checklists/ 
Report formats  YES  Checklists  Checklists  YES  NO 
Need for 
specific skills 
YES (basic 
epidemiology)  
Depending on 
the methods  NO  Depending on the 
methods 
Prior training might 
be necessary 
Consideration 
of 
vulnerabilities 
and coping 
strategies 
NO  NO  NO  NO  Possible 
Specific tool 
for 
displacement 
YES  YES  YES  NO  NO 
Strengths 
Concise, sound 
methodology, 
reliable for 
baseline data 
Comprehensive, 
consideration of 
vulnerable 
groups 
Well structured, 
easy to use at 
field level 
Very 
comprehensive, 
link between 
information to 
collect and 
methodology, 
good explanation 
of different 
methods 
Very practical for 
day-to-day use of 
qualitative methods 
Weaknesses 
Time consuming 
and resource 
heavy, need for 
epidemiological 
support as more 
complex to carry 
out  
Too descriptive, 
insufficient 
description of 
different 
methods, focus 
on camp settings 
Not 
explanatory, 
can only be 
used in 
conjunction 
with other 
assessment 
tools 
Might be too 
complex for 
emergency 
situation without 
proper training  
Not used in 
assessments   67 
Annex 5: Summary of Assessment Methods (Qualitative and Quantitative) 
Method  Strengths  Weaknesses  Limitations of use in open 
settings 
Review of secondary 
information 
Potential sources – HQ, MSF 
reports, census/vital statistics, 
Ministries, international 
organisations, local eye 
witnesses, health structures, 
internet sites for context, health 
statistics, maps, etc.  
- Possible in every situation 
(even without direct access) 
- Reliability of 
sources 
- Accuracy and 
objectivity of data 
 
·  Little information available 
for some contexts  
 
Systematic observation 
For assessing many qualitative 
aspects by walking through 
displacement site and observing 
state of the population, food and 
water sources, available assets, 
etc.  
- Wide range of information 
gathered quickly 
- Can detect unexpected 
information  
- Useful for cross-checking 
data from other sources 
- Direct/primary data 
without intermediates 
- Observer bias 
- Observer 
presence might 
affect people’s 
behaviour 
·  Difficult when population 
spread across many sites 
·  Security constraints 
·  Invisible needs 
Interviews with key persons 
People with specific knowledge of 
certain aspects of the community 
and who may represent the views 
of a population group - village 
chiefs, teachers, health staff, 
religious leaders, etc. 
Discussions with representatives 
of 
administrative and health 
authorities, local and international 
organisations 
- Wide range of information 
(including technical) can be 
gathered quickly 
- More appropriate than 
group discussions for 
sensitive issues  
- Easy to organize  
- Might not 
represent the views 
of most vulnerable 
and marginalized 
groups  
- Informant bias 
·  Difficulty of identifying key 
persons in urban setting 
(invisibility)  
Focus group discussions 
(FGD) 
Group interview (8-12 people) to 
discuss specific issues, 
composition of the group depends 
on the type of information 
needed; 
general group interviews; 
groups of people from different 
backgrounds and with different 
perspectives to discuss a variety 
of subjects 
- Possibility to target 
vulnerable groups (only 
applies to FGD) 
- Allows interaction between 
people 
- Possible to cross check 
information and probe 
issues 
- Allows to obtain 
perceptions, needs and 
priorities of the community 
- Relatively quick  
- Hierarchy or 
differences (gender, 
ethnicity) within a 
group might inhibit 
open speech 
(applies to group 
interview) 
- Translation 
 
·  Security constraints 
Survey of a representative 
sample 
Data collected in a standardized 
and structured way on a 
population sample (systematic or 
cluster sampling); retrospective 
mortality, nutritional status, 
essential needs (NFI, shelter, 
water) and its coverage, 
vaccination coverage, access to 
health, violent events, etc. 
- Wide range of information 
can be collected 
- Widely accepted 
methodology 
- Reliable baseline data 
 
- Time consuming 
and resource heavy  
- Often applied with 
insufficient rigour or 
insufficient 
knowledge on 
epidemiology 
·  Security constraints 
·  Lack of homogeneity 
among the various sites (would 
falsely average out the sample)  
·  Snap picture of changing 
situation 
·  Limited use of data (no 
standards for open setting) 
·  Need for knowledge of 
epidemiology and statistics 
Estimations on population 
through mapping, counting 
habitats, census, satellite images 
Number of displaced persons, 
age and gender distribution 
- Provides important data 
on target group   
·  Rural setting with large 
geographical spread  
·  Displaced population 
mixed with host population 
Participatory methods 
Mapping, time lines, piling, 
ranking, transect walks, etc. 
- Helps to generate 
information, particularly 
from illiterate respondents 
- Eases the discussion  
- Time consuming     68 
Annex 6: Vulnerability and Capacity Flowchart 
 
 
 
Source: IFRC (2008). Guidelines for Assessment in Emergencies. 
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Annex 10: Summary of Findings on Initial Assessments 
  Cameroon  DRC  Djibouti  Iraq  South Africa 
Objectives  Improve the 
knowledge of 
security 
situation in 
northwest 
region of CAR 
and its impact 
on 
humanitarian 
situation in 
eastern 
Cameroon 
Clarify the 
nutritional 
situation, 
reported as 
alarming by 
UNHCR 
Not reported  Assess the 
situation of 
refugees, migrants 
and asylum 
seekers living or 
passing through 
Djibouti 
 
Assess nutritional 
situation and food 
security situation 
in Djibouti 
 
Assess the living 
conditions and the 
needs (food, 
health, shelters, 
etc.) of the IDP 
families living in 
the communities 
in the Dohuk area 
Evaluate the 
medical, 
sanitation and 
legal needs of 
the 
Zimbabwean 
migrants 
Length of 
assessment 
13 days  6 days  1 months (13 days 
jointly with MSF 
OCBA)  
8 days  13 days 
Conclusions  Emergency 
situation with 
mortality rates 
(CMR, U5MR) 
above 
emergency 
threshold 
High 
prevalence of 
GAM and SAM 
Problem of 
access to 
healthcare due 
to financial 
constraint, 
problem of food 
and NFI 
No emergency 
situation, however: 
High level of acute 
malnutrition 
Large presence of 
refugees and 
illegal migrants 
High risk of 
cholera epidemic 
Satisfactory 
access to 
healthcare, but 
might deteriorate 
Lack of access to 
food and 
kerosene, and 
lack of access to 
free access to 
medication could 
put IDPs in 
precarious 
situation during 
winter season 
 
Recommenda
tions 
Rapid 
emergency 
response 
Food 
distribution  
Mobile clinics 
Develop 
communicatio
n strategy on 
humanitarian 
situation of 
refugees  
Short 
emergency 
intervention in 
Bangadi:  
Reinforce 
health 
structures 
Mobile clinics 
Measles 
vaccination  
NFI, WatSan 
STAGE 1 (ASAP) 
Relief activities in 
Ali-Adeh refugee 
camp (food, NFI, 
shelter, health) 
Nutrition activities 
(ambulatory 
treatment of acute 
malnutrition and 
support for 
Intensive TFC) 
STAGE 2 
Medical, 
psychological and 
humanitarian 
assistance  
Mobile clinics for 
psychosocial 
support 
Distribution of 
winter NFI kits, 
logistic support for 
roofing 
Monitoring, rapid 
health 
assessment in 
sub-urban areas 
Intervention in 
Musina and 
Johannesburg: 
protection-legal 
status, access 
to health 
services  
Epidemics 
Care for victims 
of violence  
Access to TB 
and HIV 
treatment. 
Relief (shelter, 
NFIs, etc) 
Psychosocial 
activities 
 